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Legacy of the Secret War
Bruce Shoemaker, Xieng Khouang, Lao PDR
The Continuing Problem of Unexploded Ordnance in Xieng Khouang Province, Laos, and the Response of the Mennonite Central Committee and the American Friends Service Committee, 1972-1994 IntroductionThis paper is intended to provide background information on one of the most enduring legacies of the American air war in Laos: the suffering to Lao people caused by the continued presence of a large amount of live unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the ground in heavily bombed areas and on the role of two American nongovernmental agencies, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), in trying to publicize and address this issue since the end of the bombing 20 years ago. The focus of the paper is on Xieng Khouang Province in northeastern Laos, the site of the "Plain of Jars" and one of the most heavily bombed areas of Laos. Although most attention and the bulk of MCC/AFSC efforts have been on Xieng Khouang, many other parts of Laos, as well as portions of neighboring Vietnam and Cambodia, have also been suffering from similar problems. This paper is being written as MCC, together with an agency new to Laos, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), are in the process of beginning a major new initiative to upgrade efforts at ordnance detection and removal in Xieng Khouang. This project, due to start later in 1994, will attempt systematic ordnance clearance on a much larger scale than ever done previously and will work to build a Lao capacity to finally resolve its still significant ordnance problem. This new phase of MCC support to Lao efforts to carry out war reconstruction activities in Laos will hopefully be able to make a serious impact on this longstanding problem. The American Air War in Laos, 1964-1973
"The roar of the bombs and the noise of the planes frightened me terribly. Our lives became like one of animals who search to escape the butchers. Each day, across the forests and ditches, we sought only to escape from the bombs. When looking at the face of my innocent child, I could not stop crying for his future”" -- from a 1971 essay by a 35-year-old woman refugee from the Plain of Jars In 1964, the United States began a covert operation of aerial warfare in Laos. In northern Laos one of the reported goals of the bombing was to "destroy the social and economic infrastructure of the areas under the control of the anti-U.S. Pathet Lao forces." In the South, a main purpose was to attempt to interdict supplies and people coming down the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" from North to South Vietnam in southeastern Laos. The effort included massive economic and political support to the Royal Lao Government and a "secret war" during which the CIA organized and supported a private army that included ethnic Hmong fighters, as well as Thai "volunteers." But mostly it involved bombing from the air on a scale never before seen in the history of the world. The U.S. dropped an estimated 6 million to 7 million bombs, plus huge but unknown numbers of antipersonnel bomblets, on Laos over the course of the nine-year air war. In Xieng Khouang an estimated 300,000 tons of bombs were dropped, for an average of more than two tons per inhabitant. The systematic destruction of Xieng Khouang dated from the bombing halt over North Vietnam in November 1968 which freed hundreds of bombers for use against Laos. Virtually the entire civilian population was forced off of the Plain of Jars during this period. Many were forcibly evacuated to refugee camps in Vientiane Province. Others fled into the caves or across the border into Vietnam. By the end of the bombing in 1973, not one structure was reported to still be standing in the entire province of Xieng Khouang. From 1964 to 1969, the bombing remained a secret to the outside world. It was only in the early 1970s that the extent of the damage caused to civilians became widely recognized. But heavy U.S. bombing continued during the early 1970s and right up until the formation of the coalition government in 1973 that brought the Pathet Lao forces into the government. Although U.S. officials continued to deny that civilians were being bombed, a growing mass of evidence showed otherwise. During 1970, a former International Voluntary Services volunteer in Laos, Fred Branfman, interviewed hundreds of refugees who had fled the bombing in Xieng Khouang. The vast majority reported having their villages bombed. He documented his findings in several articles and the 1972 book, Voices from the Plain of Jars. Even the United States Information Service’s own 1971 refugee survey revealed what the people of Xieng Khouang already knew: that there had been massive bombing of civilians and that at least 80 percent of the victims of the bombing were villagers rather than soldiers. Early ResponsesThe Mennonites and the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) are two of the largest "peace churches" in North America, and both have had long histories of opposition to war, conscription and social injustice. Both the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)--a North American-based Mennonite church agency focused on service, relief and development in the U.S., Canada and abroad--and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)--a Quaker-based agency including "people of diverse faiths concerned with issues of peace, reconciliation and social justice"--represent constituencies in North America that were naturally concerned with the war in Vietnam and U.S. policy there from the start. The AFSC had first issued a statement of concern over U.S. policy in Vietnam in 1954 which cautioned against a U.S. military role there. Both MCC and AFSC were active in what became a broad-based religious and peace movement against the war. AFSC activities included draft counseling for young people facing conscription and support for grassroots political organizing and lobbying in favor of peaceful solutions to the conflict. MCC and AFSC were particularly concerned with the humanitarian consequences of the war for civilians and identified the indiscriminate use of aerial bombing and the use of antipersonnel weapons as of prime concern. In July 1973, MCC's Earl Martin published an article in the Washington Post and other newspapers calling attention to the need to clean up unexploded munitions in Vietnam and Laos. One of the best known AFSC projects during this time was "National Action and Research on the Military-Industrial Complex" or NARMIC. NARMIC's 1972 slide show, The Automated Air War, focused on the high-technology warfare that was being waged against Laos and North Vietnam, the defense contractors supporting it and the resulting damage to people and the environment. The slide show, which was shown widely in the United States, was yet another voice which added to the growing outcry that eventually forced the U.S. Congress to respond by halting the bombing and insisting that the U.S. administration negotiate an end to the wider conflict. In addition to their peace advocacy in the United States, both MCC and AFSC initiated relief programs in Vietnam during the war. MCC assigned volunteers to work in refugee assistance programs in various provinces where the fighting was heavy. MCC also totally staffed clinics in Nhatrang and Pheiku and sponsored other scattered medical assistance. They sponsored educational assistance and agricultural support work as well. During the peak of the war this MCC work was rendered together with Lutheran World Relief and Church World Service in a coalition called Vietnam Christian Service. AFSC made a conscious decision to work on both sides of the conflict in Vietnam. Working in the South, as did almost all American agencies in Vietnam, AFSC supported a rehabilitation center in Quang Ngai Province which assisted war victims with therapy and the production of artificial limbs. AFSC also provided assistance to war victims in North Vietnam through the provision of medical relief supplies and other equipment. This brought AFSC into direct conflict with the U.S. government which deemed these activities illegal. In one dramatic incident Bob Eaton, who would eventually become an AFSC representative to Laos, piloted the "Phoenix" ship into Haiphong with a shipment of medical supplies in violation of the U.S. embargo on North Vietnam. Establishment of AFSC and MCC offices in Laos, 1974-75After making initial contacts at the time of the establishment of the coalition government and the end of fighting in 1973, AFSC began small-scale assistance to Laos and opened up an office in Vientiane in 1974. As in Vietnam, AFSC was committed to providing assistance to both sides in the conflict. One of the first involvements working through the Neo-Lao Hak Sat (NLHS, the Pathet Lao revolutionary forces) was in providing assistance to refugees returning to the Plain of Jars. Agricultural equipment was needed and AFSC provided deep-disk plows for farming land that had lain fallow for many years. Problems with unexploded ordnance were reported, and AFSC responded by importing five small Sears metal detectors for use by refugees in the NLHS zones in Xieng Khouang. AFSC first wrote to the U.S. government on April 24, 1975, inquiring about the types of ordnance that had been dropped in Laos. Some electronic ordnance had reportedly been programmed to detonate when the magnetic action of electronic metal detectors was used, and there was concern on the part of AFSC representatives Louis and Eryl Kubicka that use of the detectors might set off some ordnance. The U.S. Department of Defense replied that enough time should have passed by to render this characteristic inoperative but they couldn't guarantee this due to the possibility of weapon malfunctions. Other problems also arose with the use of the detectors. The NLHS reported that these unsophisticated detectors were not so useful because they detected every small piece of shrapnel and couldn't distinguish this shrapnel from larger bombs and bomblets. In addition, the difficult logistics made replacement of batteries difficult. No electricity was available in Xieng Khouang to allow for battery recharging. It was apparent that more advanced technical training and equipment were needed, but political and infrastructural restrictions made this impossible. AFSC concluded that for the time being the provision of additional metal detectors would not be appropriate. When MCC opened up its office in Laos in 1975, healing the wounds of war was also a central priority. MCC had already been involved in ordnance clearance in Vietnam through the work of Pat and Earl Martin in Quang Ngai Province during 1974-75. There they determined that the munitions causing most post-war casualties were not large bombs or shells, but were small unexploded "antipersonnel" bomblets and grenades. They discovered that plowing such ordnance-littered fields with an armored tractor--dangerous as that was--was safer than tilling by unprotected farmers with simple broad-blade hoes as was custom. Initial MCC work in Laos concentrated on assistance to war refugees as they resettled back on the Plain of Jars and in other areas. Seed rice, agricultural tools, water buffaloes and housing construction materials were provided. MCC staff were also active in requesting information on ordnance from the U.S. military at this time. In these years, the U.S. Department of Defense released no helpful information. Post-war Xieng Khouang
"In September 1969, after a recorded history of 700 years, the Plain of Jars disappeared.... [It] had become the first society to vanish through automated warfare." -- Fred Branfman, Voices from the Plain of Jars, 1972 In 1976 and 1977, disturbing reports from Xieng Khouang reached Vientiane, where MCC and AFSC were based and working through the central government, of:
"...a formerly prosperous people still stunned and demoralized by the destruction of their villages, the annihilation of their livestock, the cratering of their fields, and the realization that every stroke of their hoes is potentially fatal." -- letter to MCC U.S. from Murray Hiebert, February 18, 1977 In November 1977, MCC Lao representatives Linda and Murray Hiebert and AFSC representatives Eyrl and Louis Kubicka joined the first delegation of Westerners to visit Xieng Khouang and the Plain of Jars since the end of the bombing. (MCC and AFSC were the only western nongovernmental agencies to maintain offices in Laos after the change of government in 1975.) They found a place still devastated by the war and with few apparent available resources aside from people determined to move on with the process of rebuilding. In their meeting with local officials, Mr. Yong Yia, the provincial vice-chairman, made a special appeal to the delegation to help with the problem of unexploded ordnance stating that it was the single biggest problem facing the province in post-war reconstruction. He presented statistics showing that 237 people had been killed and another 343 seriously wounded by unexploded ordnance in the five years since the war ended. The province also had statistics showing that over 8000 civilians had been killed during the bombing of Xieng Khouang and quantified many other aspects of the physical destruction of the province. The most serious problem involved the anti-personnel cluster bomblets (CBUs) (known as "bombies" in Lao) which had been dropped by the U.S. A large but unknown percentage of these bomblets were defective and had not exploded on or shortly after impact as they were supposed to have done. Over time the bomblets were working their way under the soil where, when hit by a farmer's hoe or otherwise disturbed, they would often explode sending out a blast of steel ball bearings which injure or kill people nearby. Sometimes accidents occur when young children, not aware of what they are playing with, toss or play with the bomblets or when people unknowingly light a fire on top of ground where bomblets are buried. Thousands of hectares of Xieng Khouang were believed to be infested with antipersonnel bomblets. Large unexploded bombs and shells, most potentially live, also littered many parts of the province. The delegation traveled to Khoun District, the site of the former provincial capita. Where previously a town of 12,000 people had stood, they found a village of 800 people living in thatch huts. The town's temple, Wat Siphom, was in ruins even as its Buddha image remained standing. Not one structure had been untouched by the bombing. They also traveled east to Kham District, a strategic area during the fighting and the site of what was probably the single biggest tragedy of the U.S. bombing in Laos. On November 24, 1968, over 300 Lao taking shelter in the Pieu Cave were killed when what was probably an F-105 jet fighter-bomber bombed the mouth of the cave. They talked with a farmer who had witnessed the bombing while working in the fields outside the cave. His entire family had been inside and were all killed. Now he worried about who would take care of him in his old age. Everywhere they went people had stories of suffering they had been through during the bombing. Although the case of Xieng Khouang is particularly dramatic, many other parts of Laos were also heavily bombed. For much of the war the NLHS revolutionary forces controlled up to two-thirds of the land area of Laos and at one time or another much of this area was bombed, including bombing with antipersonnel cluster bomblets. Houa Phan Province, located just north of Xieng Khouang and the base area of the Pathet Lao leadership, was bombed repeatedly. In the 1990s, frequent reports of ordnance-related accidents are reported and the provincial governor still considers UXO clean-up to be a high priority. While the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" area of southeastern Laos--in Savannakhet, Saravane, Attapeu and present-day Sekong Provinces--received the heaviest bombing, other northern provinces such as Luang Prabang, Oudomsay and Luang Namtha were also bombed and have ordnance problems to varying degrees. Some antipersonnel bombing in the south was also done far from the Ho Chi Minh Trail--such as in Paksong in Champassak and in central Savannakhet Province. Responding to the Ordnance ProblemBy far most of the work of clearing ordnance from agricultural and other land in Xieng Khouang has been done by the Lao people themselves, without the benefit of outside aid or advice. In the immediate post-war period most governmental/military efforts went into defusing large bombs and resettling internally displaced refugees. Local farmers needing to clear land to grow food have had to clear the cluster bomblets themselves. This has been a painstaking and dangerous task. Farmers have had to learn how to handle live ordnance by trial and error--with the penalties for errors including serious injury, amputation and death. Often this process involves plowing up a field, using a water buffalo if available, and then searching for exposed bomblets. The bomblets are then gingerly picked up and deposited in a pit or gully near the rice field. Over time, a great deal of local knowledge has been built up on techniques for ordnance clearance and a significant, but undetermined, amount of farm land has been cleared this way. It would be interesting and instructive to further research the local methods and knowledge built up in Laos on ordnance removal. No society in the history of the world had ever been bombed to the extent that Xieng Khouang was during 1964-73. And so, isolated post-war Laos was also the first society to have to try to figure out how to resolve the legacy of such a bombing. Unfortunately, the most important lesson learned from this experience seems to be just how long the legacy is--who could have imagined that in 1993 a whole generation of Lao people not even alive during the war would still be facing injury and death in their rice fields from defective bombs dropped 20-25 years before? The only large-scale assistance for ordnance removal in Xieng Khouang was provided by a team of 12 Soviet experts over a period of 18 months in 1979-80. These advisors trained 120 Lao trainees and employed metal detectors mounted on the front of jeeps which were driven slowly over the area to be cleared. Some 5000 hectares were reportedly cleared of over 12,700 explosive remnants of many types without any casualties being suffered. Most of the clearance occurred around the Soviet-supported state farm at Latsen on the Plain of Jars. Unfortunately, at the end of the Soviet involvement the provincial capacity to continue to fund or manage additional clearance work remained very low. The trainees were spread out over five provinces but had insufficient funding or technical back-up to continue clearance work. Five metal detectors had been left but, the team ran out of batteries to operate them as well as the needed explosives to detonate ordnance they found. Both the Mennonite Central Committee and the American Friends Service Committee have made the ordnance issue an important focus of their work in Laos. Their efforts have taken a number of forms over the last 20 years. MCC Tractor ProjectFollowing the MCC and AFSC representatives' first visit to Xieng Khouang and after months of subsequent negotiations, the Lao government gave official approval to MCC and AFSC ordnance clearing activities in the summer of 1979. As part of the project, MCC agreed to provide a specially modified tractor to help clear fields of unexploded ordnance in Xieng Khouang. The International Harvester 674 tractor arrived in Vientiane in April 1980 complete with an AR-70 Howard Spike Rotovator (in the rear of the tractor), axle with chain flails, and thick metal shielding in the front and around the cab. The tractor was air-freighted into Xieng Khouang shortly thereafter. MCC co-representative Fred Schartzendruber created quite a stir as he prepared to go to Meng Khouang to test out the tractor himself. U.S. Embassy officials became alarmed at the potential for an accident and cabled to Washington asking the State Department to try to persuade MCC in the U.S. to cancel the project. This led to a rash of hurried communications between MCC in the U.S. and Laos and the State Department. Despite the concern and publicity raised, the actual operation of the tractor proved to be a disappointment. In a trial run only about one-third of the bombies encountered exploded. Despite several modifications this ratio was not improved. The tractor eventually proved somewhat useful in simply plowing up land, which then could be visually inspected for bomblets. In 1984, it was used to plow open land left fallow since the height of the bombing. Villagers in one area cleared a three-acre plot uncovering over 20 bomblets. But the tractor was never able to make a serious impact on UXO clearance in the province. AFSC/HI Assistance for Rehabilitation CentersOne aspect of AFSC's response to the victims of the air war was to provide support to the Lao National Rehabilitation Center which works to provide artificial limbs and therapy for amputees. In 1980, this initially took the form of material equipment for the center. In 1984, AFSC was able to provide a technician under secondment from Operation Handicap International, a French nongovernmental organization. By 1986, OHI was given permission to establish its own administrative office in Vientiane and to expand the program to include material and technical support for provincial workshops in Xieng Khouang, Luang Prabang and other locations. The Shovels Project, 1977-1991At the time of the first AFSC/MCC delegation to Xieng Khouang in November 1977, AFSC representatives suggested that using pitchforks or shovels might be a safer alternative to the traditional Lao hoe which is swung over the head when hand tilling the soil and which strikes the ground with a heavy impact. AFSC followed this up with a delivery of 80 pitchforks and shovels. During a visit the next year, province officials responded positively, reporting that farmers found the shovels to be an effective alternative to hoes. They requested AFSC/MCC assistance in providing additional shovels. Upon reaching an agreement with central authorities in 1980, AFSC purchased and sent 620 U.S.-made shovels to Xieng Khouang in early 1981 at a cost of $4305. AFSC received $600 of Ocean Freight Reimbursement from USAID for this shipment--possibly the only U.S. governmental aid given for UXO work in Laos between 1975 and 1991. These shovels, made by the Ames Tool Company in Parkersburg, West Virginia, were distributed widely in the province--but still reached only a small percentage of farming families in affected areas. Based on the very positive response that was received from Lao villagers and officials, MCC and AFSC decided to make a major commitment to the shovels program. This would include both the provision of large numbers of shovels to affected villagers and public education and fundraising efforts in the United States. A number of other agencies contributed to the 1982 shovel purchase including Oxfam America, the Christopher Reynolds Foundation and Kvekerhjelp, the Norwegian Quaker agency. NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for International Development, provided co-funding for Kvekerhjelp. The Canadian Friends Service Committee, with co-funding from the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Fund of the Canadian International Development Agency, made a separate purchase of 700 shovels. MCC funds purchased 1,200 shovels and another private donor an additional 600 shovels. This added up to a total of 12,600 shovels which were sent from the U.S. to Laos in 1983. New AFSC representatives to Laos, Wendy Batson and Bob Eaton, negotiated with the Lao government on a distribution plan and later followed up by visiting the provinces where shovels were distributed. They found that distribution went very well and that the shovels were greatly appreciated. No bombie-related incidents were reported by people using the shovels. Individual contributions received for shovels by AFSC following former AFSC Lao representatives Roger Rumpf and Jacqui Chagon's speaking tour in the U.S. allowed for an additional 1984 purchase of 4000 shovels by AFSC which were all sent to Xieng Khouang and distributed to all districts of the province. Lawsuit Settlement Brings an Unexpected ContributionIn April 1985, the out-of-court settlement of a longstanding lawsuit, brought by U.S.-based peace groups against the federal government and the Honeywell Corporation, provided an additional contribution to the AFSC shovels project and a new wave of publicity. The suit stemmed from incidents during the Vietnam War era when the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) engaged in illegal surveillance, infiltration and wiretapping of groups involved in the Vietnam War peace movement. One group, the Honeywell Project, was based in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and focused on the locally headquartered Honeywell Corporation which, in addition to producing consumer products such as thermostats, was also a leading manufacturer of BLU-26 antipersonnel cluster bomblets, BLU-54 antipersonnel land mines and other weapon systems including military command computer systems. From the mid-1960s on, the Honeywell Project organized a long-term series of protests at Honeywell headquarters which included nonviolent civil disobedience as well as other advocacy and public education with the goal of pressuring Honeywell to cease production of antipersonnel weapons and to convert its production to the manufacture of socially useful products. The Honeywell Project, along with many other peace groups, suffered from a massive campaign of surveillance and interference by the federal government during the war. In 1977, after the public exposure of the FBI campaign and Honeywell's cooperation with it in the early 1970s, a number of individuals and agencies, led by Marv Davidov of the Honeywell Project and including the American Civil Liberties Union (which provided legal council), Clergy and Laity Concerned, AFSC and others, prepared a lawsuit seeking damages from the illegal surveillance from the federal government and Honeywell arguing that their legal right to protest had been infringed upon. It wasn't until 1985, however, that the lawsuit was finally resolved when the federal government and Honeywell each agreed to pay $35,000 to the plaintiffs. Honeywell's portion was awarded to the ACLU which then turned it over to the AFSC Laos program for the purchase of additional shovels for use in areas still affected by (in part, Honeywell-produced) cluster bomblets. Although the settlement amount was not large, it received widespread publicity and was hailed by peace groups as the first to tie in a major defense contractor to the FBI's massive operation against the anti-war movement and for the use of the money to provide reparations to the war's civilian victims. The Honeywell Project continued their actions in Minneapolis through the 1980s and up until Honeywell's 1990 decision to end their involvement in defense contracting by spinning off their weapons production to a new corporation. (This new company, Alliant Techsystems of Edina, Minnesota, has recently been active in lobbying against the new U.S. ban on the export of antipersonnel weapons.) Using, in part, the Honeywell money, an additional 7,050 shovels were purchased in 1985. Of these 1,900 went to Xieng Khouang while other affected provinces, including Houa Phan, Luang Namtha, Oudomsay, Phongsali, Khammoune, Savannakhet, Salavan, Sekong and Bolikhamsai all received smaller numbers of shovels. In 1987, MCC provided assistance to the Lao Farm Tools Company in Vientiane to help them produce Lao-made shovels. MCC then purchased 1,500 shovels for general distribution in Xieng Khouang as well as additional shovels for use at agricultural training schools that MCC was supporting. With MCC concentrating their work on UXO in Xieng Khouang, AFSC decided to provide additional aid in Savannakhet, another severely affected province through which the wartime Ho Chi Minh Trail had run. Four thousand Lao-made shovels were distributed there in early 1988 with the German church agency Bread for the World providing most of the funding through AFSC. But when monitoring took place the next year AFSC staff found that the Lao-made shovels were of inferior quality and did not prove satisfactory. They generally would not hold up to more than one year of heavy use. In 1990, based on provincial requests, AFSC decided to make one final shovel distribution to a heavily affected area which had not been reached by previous shovel distributions--the remote provinces of Sekong (particularly Dak Chueng District) and Attepeu which were on the southern end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos. Given the problems with the Lao shovels, AFSC returned to the Ames Tool Company in the U.S. for a final order of 2,100 shovels for Sekong and Attepeu which were distributed in early 1991. The German Quaker agency, Quakerhilfe, provided partial funding for this purchase. With this distribution completed, AFSC, while still concerned about the ordnance issue, decided to end the shovels project and to concentrate its efforts in Laos on other rural development issues.
From 1977 until 1991 a total of over 30,000 shovels were distributed by AFSC and MCC in Laos. The shovels project was credited by many Lao farmers and officials with helping to prevent large numbers of "bombie" accidents as well as providing badly needed farm tools during a period of war reconstruction. In addition, the project had provided a major opportunity for publicizing the issue of leftover war ordnance in Laos, the U.S. role in its creation and the U.S. responsibility for helping to alleviate the problem. But an incident which occurred outside of Phonesavanh in the 1992 rainy season illustrates the limits of the shovels project. A local Hmong farmer who had used a shovel to clear fields that hadn't been used since before the war continued using shovels for the next two years. By then he assumed he had found and removed all the bombies. So he returned to using the faster and easier Lao hoe. But he still ended up hitting a bomblet. It exploded, killing him and seriously injuring two other people. MCC UXO Project, 1982-1992As AFSC concentrated on shovel distributions, MCC continued with a series of project initiatives in actually clearing land of ordnance. Following up on the tractor project, MCC experimented further with the use of metal detectors. In late 1985, after the province came up with what seemed like a sound method of detecting and destroying ordnance, MCC, with funding support from Church World Service, purchased a vehicle and other equipment for the project. In 1986, a 12 hectare area was successfully cleared for a UNHCR-sponsored refugee resettlement village project as well as a second village and a school complex. In 1987, the Lao government and MCC agreed on additional assistance whereby MCC-equipped teams from the Xieng Khouang Social Welfare Department would engage in detection and removal of ordnance from high priority areas--both farmland and other areas slated for community development projects. Using a grant from the Swedish church agency Diakonia, MCC provided a new pick-up truck, fuel and minor operating support, and other material for the UXO team. But MCC was unable to locate a technician to come and train the Lao team on proper use of metal detectors. Without such training, MCC representatives felt that it would be inappropriate to provide metal detectors. Progress was very slow. A series of problems plagued the project including long delays in approvals and negotiations at the national government level and management and resource problems at the provincial level. Despite their expressed interest in the project, the province, acting through the provincial Social Welfare Department, was not able to put together a consistent team to work on the project on a regular basis. In addition, the lack of a technical expert (either Lao or foreign) on unexploded ordnance removal didn't allow for use of sophisticated metal detectors or the development of a systematic methodology and so severely limited the potential effectiveness of the project. As MCC recruited for a UXO specialist who would be acceptable to the Lao government, several trial detection and removal efforts were made. Using Lao Army trainers who themselves had been trained by a U.S. Army team in Vientiane in May 1991 (see below), MCC supported a training seminar for provincial staff during May 11-16, 1992. During their field demonstration in Muang Soui, the team found and exploded 56 bomblets in a small area. Their efforts allowed this land to be farmed for the first time since the bombing. Problems included the effectiveness of the metal detectors which could only find bomblets within 20-30 centimeters of the ground surface. In October 1992, another 10 days of operation cleared a five hectare site, again in Muang Soui, finding and destroying 413 bombs, mostly "guava" cluster bomblets. In January 1993, another attempt cleared two hectares over two days finding 43 bomblets and 14 larger bombs. These efforts demonstrated the potential for doing more systematic clearance and also the enormity of the continuing problem. But the combination of the lack of provincial management capacity and resources combined with the lack of outside expertise still stood in the way of launching a more effective and comprehensive project that could make a serious impact on the remaining UXO problem in Xieng Khouang. During this time Savannakhet Province also requested assistance with establishing an Unexploded Ordnance clearance capacity. In 1987, upon receiving word from the Charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Laos that the U.S. government would be willing to contribute to such a project but lacked a request, AFSC representatives working in Savannakhet encouraged the province to draw up a formal proposal. The province subsequently gave AFSC one- and five-year proposals for equipping and supporting UXO clearance teams. But upon returning from Washington, the Charge informed AFSC that there was no political will in the U.S. government to support such a project at that time. The province submitted a revised and more detailed proposal to AFSC in 1989. Due to the limited success of the UXO work in Xieng Khouang and the apparent need to provide appropriate technical advice as well as material assistance, AFSC decided to hold off on a UXO project for Savannakhet until after seeing some success with the Xieng Khouang project and until after the technical capacity, which AFSC lacked, became available. Advocacy EffortsBoth MCC and AFSC made public advocacy and awareness-raising a main part of their response--an effort which overall has been considerably more successful than actual UXO clearance efforts. As some of the only Americans traveling upcountry in Laos in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Vientiane-based MCC and AFSC representatives were in a unique position to interpret the reality of post-war Laos to the outside world. Shortly after their first visit in 1977, both the Hieberts and Kubickas published articles about Xieng Khouang in publications such as the Far Eastern Economic Review, Los Angeles Times and elsewhere. AFSC field staff briefed and encouraged numerous journalists and other delegations to visit Xieng Khouang to examine post-war problems. The unexploded ordnance issue was subsequently covered by ABC-TV's 20/20 program, New York Times, Washington Post, BBC-TV, Far Eastern Economic Review and others. In September 1978, based on their briefings with MCC and AFSC, a U.S. congressional delegation on MIAs first expressed interest in the unexploded ordnance problem. In 1980, AFSC wrote to influential U.S. congressional representatives documenting the situation in Xieng Khouang and requesting that the U.S. consider assistance to Laos. MCC and AFSC staff were able to provide briefings to several congressional representatives during their visits to Laos including Senator Hayakawa, a California Republican close to Ronald Reagan. After his trip to Laos in 1981, Senator Hayakawa recommended that the U.S. give aid to Laos for cleaning up ordnance in affected areas. The Lao government, however, rejected this proposal, stating that they would prefer aid for constructing schools and hospitals. Observers saw the Lao government as understandably suspicious and sensitive to the idea of what would be U.S. military personnel working in remote areas of Laos at the same time that the U.S. was also believed to be supporting a right-wing resistance fighting against Vientiane and during a period when the U.S. was proclaiming the "Reagan Doctrine" which envisioned the violent rollback of Communist revolutions throughout the developing world. But the rejection did highlight an early frustration regarding the MCC and AFSC focus on the unexploded ordnance issue. At the local level in Xieng Khouang and in other ordnance-affected areas, it was obvious that ordnance was a major problem causing great suffering to people trying to rebuild their lives. Local officials considered it a high priority. However, decision-makers at the central level of the Lao government based in Vientiane, looking at the overall developmental situation of the country and faced with many pressing needs, did not always view the ordnance issue as a top priority when requesting outside development assistance. In the early 1980s, the AFSC in the United States used documentation from Xieng Khouang in an effort to lobby for a ban on the manufacture and use of cluster bomblets--a campaign made poignant by the use of U.S.-provided cluster bomblets during that time by Israel against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon. In 1983, concerned legislators proposed legislation to ban the export of U.S.-made cluster bomblets for the first time. However, it would take nine more years for a U.S. ban on the export of antipersonnel weapons finally to be passed. With AFSC and Christopher Reynolds Foundation support, the Washington, D.C.-based Asia Resource Center (ARC) scheduled a nine-month speaking tour to 45 cities during 1982 for Jacquelyn Chagnon and Roger Rumpf (AFSC Lao field representatives during 1978-81). Over 100 newspaper, television and radio stations interviewed them focusing on the unexploded ordnance problem. Articles appeared in newspapers such as Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor and the Chicago Tribune. Besides publicity, the tour also raised approximately $30,000 for shovels. Donations came from people and organizations including Lao refugees in the U.S. Thereafter, ARC produced Chagnon and Rumpf's slideshow, The Gentle People: A Look Inside Laos, which highlighted the unexploded ordnance problem and requested donations for shovels. It and the video, A Journey to Laos, each sold over 200 copies. The video was filmed in Xieng Khouang during an ARC-led delegation trip and highlighted ordnance issues through an interview with a Hmong family during a funeral for their son who was killed by a "bombie." ARC also helped distribute the AFSC leaflet seeking $10 donations to buy a shovel. Later ARC also established two "Swords into Plowshares" exhibits of war materials made into everyday household utensils that had been collected by MCC and AFSC staff in Laos. In 1986, Titus and Linda Peachey, who had just left Laos after representing MCC there for five years, spent three months producing a slide show, Making War in Peace, which featured Xieng Khouang villagers recalling the bombing and documented their struggles to rebuild their lives while still suffering from the after-effects of the war. It also focused on the connection to home--places in the U.S. where ever more sophisticated antipersonnel weapons are being produced. The slide show was presented by the Peacheys to over 75 groups in the U.S. and helped to bring further awareness to North Americans about the suffering that the U.S. bombing had caused and was continuing to cause for Lao people and for the need to prevent such occurrences in the future. The slide show was also translated into Lao and shown Laos. MCC and AFSC Lao and home office staff have continued to provide briefings and information to outsiders on the Lao ordnance problem up to the present day. By the early 1990s, relations with the U.S. Embassy in Laos were cordial enough that the embassy was sending their interested visitors over to the MCC and AFSC offices in Vientiane to be briefed on UXO issues! MCC has been able to continue generating media interest in Lao ordnance issues as its new initiative with the Mines Advisory Group unfolds with recent publicity in the Bangkok Post, Bangkok Nation, BBC Radio and TV World Service, and the London Observer. Recent DevelopmentsDespite long-term concern and repeated efforts, MCC staff by early 1993 were frustrated at the lack of progress in actually clearing land of bomblets. New MCC country representative Jim Kurtz and others were debating the future of the project and questioning whether the time and money spent on UXO might better be spent on other projects. (In addition to UXO work, MCC also supports projects in sustainable agriculture, community development, water supply and primary health care at the village level in Laos.) But at the same time other events have been improving the prospect for bringing increased attention, resources and capacities to address the UXO problem in Laos. Widespread publicity of the landmine issue in Afghanistan, Cambodia and other countries has brought new interest and capabilities to the whole area of landmine and UXO clearance. Several international NGOs, as well as many private companies, now exist with specific mandates and capacities to work on landmine clearance. Out of this experience and more widespread recognition of the long-term humanitarian consequences of the use of antipersonnel weapons towards civilian victims have come new efforts to bring the production, transfer and use of such weapons under control. In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed a one-year prohibition on the export of U.S.-made antipersonnel mines. In 1993, this was extended for an additional three years. An international campaign calling for a worldwide ban has begun led by a growing coalition of humanitarian agencies. Despite these efforts, the widespread manufacture and use of antipersonnel weapons make control difficult. Obtaining a worldwide ban will not be easy and will likely require a sustained effort. Even with a ban, the consequences of antipersonnel weapons already produced and used will continue to remain a major problem for many years to come. In 1991, the U.S. government initiated a prosthetics project in Laos meant to address some of the humanitarian issues from the war facing Laos. Using "Leahy Amendment" funds, the project, implemented through the U.S.-based NGO World Vision, began work in both Xieng Khouang and Savannakhet Provinces focusing on direct assistance to disabled people including support for provincial rehabilitation workshops and various material aid. One aspect of this project has been a community awareness project focused on preventing future injuries from unexploded ordnance. Training for village leaders has been provided and a number of pamphlets and posters distributed. No actual UXO clearance is included in the project, however. In May 1991, the U.S. provided its first direct UXO aid to Laos. The U.S. Army sent a team to provide training to Lao army staff on safe methods for detection and destruction of UXO. Several metal detectors were donated at the end of the training. Unfortunately, this was not followed up by the provision of any operating funds to support actual ordnance clearance and at present, despite some indications of interest, no further assistance in this area has been agreed on. MCC was able to use two of the personnel trained by the U.S. to lead training of provincial personnel in Xieng Khouang in 1992. Lao government attitudes towards UXO assistance appear to be evolving as well. In 1993, on two separate occasions, the Lao foreign minister and vice minister speaking in international forums both mentioned unexploded ordnance as one of the humanitarian issues facing Laos. There also appears to be a new receptiveness to the idea of having foreign specialists involved in ordnance clearance in Laos as technical advisors. Events in 1993 and early 1994 are increasing interest in UXO issues in Laos. As Lao refugees repatriate from camps in China and Thailand, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) has been involved in preparing sites for group resettlements. They are finding their work hampered by the presence of UXO. One site where UNHCR plans to resettle over 100 refugee families, in Nambak District of northern Luang Prabang Province, was found to be heavily contaminated and will have to be cleared in advance of beginning any agricultural activities there. Private companies involved in mineral exploration, including U.S.-based Hunt Oil Company which is exploring for oil in southern Laos, are having to hire private ordnance clearance companies to clear out sites where they are doing drilling and exploration. The U.S. government's direct interests and operations in Laos are also being affected. MIA (missing in action) crash site investigation teams have had to do UXO clearance around their sites before beginning excavations. At one site they reportedly discovered over 60 pieces of UXO. In Houa Phan Province, the site of the United State's only significant bilateral aid to Laos--an integrated development project focused on crop substitution in an opium growing area--an even more ironical situation has developed. A centerpiece of the project is to be three medium-sized irrigation projects which will also generate hydropower. Over the last two years project staff developed plans for these projects and then tendered and contracted for the construction work. With contracts signed and engineers arriving on the scene, some pieces of UXO were noticed at one of the sites. This led to a survey of all three sites by an outside company which revealed the presence of large amounts of U.S.-made UXO. This in turn is leading to an embarrassing and expensive delay in the project as construction contracts are delayed and preparations are made for conducting UXO removal--a process estimated to take at least six months and to cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Recent MCC ActivitiesIn early 1993, MCC made contact with the Mines Advisory Group and inquired about their potential interest in UXO clearance work in Laos. MAG had begun its work three years previously in Afghanistan and has also been working on landmine clearance in Iraqi Kurdistan, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Cambodia. In June 1993, MCC arranged for a MAG specialist team to visit Xieng Khouang for 12 days to assess the situation and to suggest possible strategies for future UXO work. Their findings were both disturbing and hopeful. MAG staff were impressed at the size and intensity of the problem in Xieng Khouang. The large variety of ordnance creates challenges in removal. Their discovery of many devices which appeared to be rare prototypes never seen elsewhere supported MAG's conclusion that Xieng Khouang had been used as a ground for untried ordnance. "Our experts concluded that either by accident or design Laos was used as a testing ground to find the best type of air-deployed submunitions," said MAG director Rae McGrath. "It's an embarrassment for the United States. It was so irresponsible to use ordnance without knowing how long it would last." The MAG experts found the longevity of many of the devices, which had been dropped 20 to 25 years previously, particularly disturbing. There is a potential for some bombs to become less stable over time, increasing the chance of detonation. Also increasing the potential for future ordnance incidents are population and land pressures in Xieng Khouang and other provinces. It was only in 1992 that Xieng Khouang regained its pre-war population. The population is continuing to increase at a rapid rate. In addition, refugees who call Xieng Khouang home are starting to return from Thailand. The need to limit slash-and-burn farming in upland areas is also leading to more intensive cultivation of the lowlands. Several of the reported ordnance incidents in Xieng Khouang in 1993 involved Hmong people who had migrated from remote areas down to the central Plain of Jars and who then struck ordnance as they were planting gardens and fruit trees on land being cultivated for the first time since the bombing. Pressure to further utilize existing agricultural land in the province will only increase and much of this is land that until now has been left aside due to high amounts of ordnance. But MAG was also positive about the possibilities of alleviating Xieng Khouang's UXO problem through a comprehensive program of ordnance detection and removal. Commented MAG staff person Paul Davies, "This is a solvable problem. If the will on the part of the Lao government and international community exists to address it, the technical challenges can be overcome." Future Directions: The MCC/MAG InitiativeTwenty years after the cessation of the air war and after many years of small-scale efforts to publicize and alleviate its after-effects, MCC is now working in cooperation with the Mines Advisory Group and the Lao government on a major new initiative to systematically survey, detect and remove unexploded ordnance in Laos. This new project aims to build on previous Lao efforts to detect and remove ordnance by addressing the continued ordnance problem in a systematic way through survey and planning work, provision of appropriate equipment, and technical advise which will work to build up a local capacity to clear large areas of the province and, eventually, other provinces facing the same problem. During the first year of the project, MAG will provide a team of two ordnance specialists and one project supervisor/community awareness specialist. The ordnance specialists will train two teams of 10 Lao each in surveying, marking and eradicating antipersonnel bombs. The training will focus on the need to establish a disciplined, expert and well-equipped indigenous capability to eradicate unstable ordnance. The 20 deminers will then be deployed in the field with the MAG technicians providing advice on methodology, safety and quality assurance. Two additional Lao staff will receive advanced training ordnance surveillance and mapping. Other activities to be carried out include:
The MAG team will work under the auspices of the MCC office in the Lao PDR, based out of a provincial office in Phonsavanh, the provincial capital. MCC will provide one expatriate project coordinator to provide overall agency coordination and field logistical support and to liaise with Lao counterpart agencies. The MCC coordinator will also assist in interpreting the project goals and MCC's involvement to visitors, donors and media and will relate to local communities where the project is operating. A national project director will be appointed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to function as a government counterpart to the MCC project coordinator. Within the province the project will work through the Department of Social Welfare and the Provincial Administrative Committee. The MCC Vientiane office will also assist with project logistics as needed. As the project progresses, the MAG specialists will also plan on conducting initial survey and technical assessments in Savannakhet, Saravane and Sekong Provinces and presenting reports and recommendations for remedial action. At the end of the first year a full project assessment in cooperation with Lao authorities will be conducted in order to decide on the future direction of the project and its requirements for further external assistance. It will likely take several years to complete ordnance clearance in Xieng Khouang. MCC and MAG are currently raising funds for this initial first year of joint activity. Close to one million dollars are required and donations are sought from concerned individuals, agencies and institutions. No U.S. government money will be used during this initial phase of ordnance clearance in Xieng Khouang. Other ProvincesThe MCC/MAG initiative will focus in Xieng Khouang. Unfortunately, as detailed above, this is not the only place in Laos still suffering from UXO. Houa Phan and parts of other northern provinces still have substantial problems. The problem in the southeast of Laos along the former "Ho Chi Minh Trail" remains acute. Provincial authorities in Savannakhet have reportedly again requested assistance for a UXO clearance project after hearing about the MCC/MAG project now under preparation. International NGO staff working in hospitals in eastern Savannakhet confirm that ordnance-related accidents continue to occur there at a high rate. The cost of comprehensive clean-up will be considerable and will require funding beyond the capacity of small agencies such as MCC, but only a tiny fraction of the more than 10 billion dollars spent bombing Laos would be enough to have a large impact. Hopefully in a time of better relations with the Indochinese countries and given the increased international consciousness about the harm to civilians caused by antipersonnel weapons, the institution responsible for carrying out the bombing of Laos will soon finally be willing to render the assistance needed to resolve this longstanding problem. The positive psychological impact of such a move could be considerable as well. For the people of Xieng Khouang and elsewhere in Laos, official U.S. aid--for UXO clearance and other developmental priorities--would be welcome, albeit long overdue, reparations and justice for what was a cruel and irresponsible policy carried out with little justification in the first place.
"What does it mean, after all, when the strongest of the species is systematically killing and maiming some of the weakest? ...and the most prosperous regularly destroying the homes and belongings of some of the poorest? ...the most industrialized constantly devastating the land and food supplies of some of the most rural? ...and the most technically advanced using their most sophisticated weaponry against a people who pose the most marginal of challenge to their interests?" -- "The Era of the Blue Machine," Fred Branfman, 1971 Bibliography/Further ReadingAdams and McCoy. Laos War and Revolution. New York: Harper Colophon, 1970. (See Chapter 25, "Life in Pathet Lao Liberated Zones," and Chapter 12, "Presidential War in Laos 1964-70," and the section on the air war pp. 231-242). The Air War in Indochina: A Report by the Center for International Studies. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1971. The Arms Project. Landmines: A Deadly Legacy. New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 1993. Branfman, Fred. "The Era of the Blue Machine, Laos: 1969-," Washington Monthly, July 1971. Voices from the Plain of Jars. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Congressional Record, August 3, 1971, pp. S12929-12970 and S15765-15782. (Debate on bombing.) A Criminal War Doomed to Fail: Nixon's "Special" War in Laos. Lao liberated areas: Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front, July 1972. Hiebert, Linda and Murray. "Laos Recovers from America's War," Southeast Asia Chronicle (Southeast Asia Resource Center, Berkeley), 61, March-April, 1978. Martin, Earl S., and Murray Hiebert. "4. Explosive Remnants of the Second Indochina War in Vietnam and Laos," in Explosive Remnants of War: Mitigating the Environmental Effects. London: Taylor and Francis, 1985. |
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