The NATO action against the government of Slobodan Milosevic in the Spring of 1999, the 25th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, and protests over the US military's use of a Puerto Rican island as a bombing training ground have refocused the world's attention on the use of cluster munitions. Disturbingly similar stories reach us from places as diverse as Laos, Kosovo, Iraq, and Chechnya. A group of children discover an intriguing object the size of a tennis ball or soda can or hockey puck, begin to play with the object, and end up being killed, maimed, or blinded when the object explodes. The object, of course, is an unexploded submunition.
"Submunitions" (also known as bomblets or "bomb live units"--BLUs) are "delivered" to their destinations by aircraft, artillery shells, and variety of missiles. What follows is a catalogue of these weapons and the variety of ways the US military and defense contractors have developed to deliver their lethal (and often defective) parcels to target.
Aircraft dropped cluster munitions are carried most typically by "munitions dispensers," large clam shelled like canisters which can contain several hundred submunitions or bomblets. Aircraft can also drop cruise missiles tipped with cluster bomblet warheads, a weapon which is discussed in more detail in a separate section.
The Rockeye Cluster Bomb consists of three primary assemblies: a nose with an MK339 mechanical time fuze, the dispenser which contains 247 MK 118 bomblets or submunitions, and the tail assembly.(3)
The MK 118 bomblet consists of a cone-shaped charge warhead, the fuzing system, and tail assembly. When the bomblet is freed from the dispenser, it falls freely through the air, arming itself on the way to the target.(4)
The MK 118 bomblet weighs 1.32 pounds, and contains a shaped charge capable of piercing 7.5 inches of armor and 31 inches of reinforced concrete. The .4 pounds of high explosives in each bomblet produce a jet of super heated gas, creating up to 250,000 psi at the point of impact.(5)
If the tip of the bomblet hits a hard surface, the shaped charge is set off. If the bomblet hits a soft target, a firing pin sets off the warhead, which fragments and sends shrapnel through the air at high velocity. The 247 bomblets disperse over an area roughly the size of a football field.(6)
Rockeye dud rates were reported to be extremely high during the Gulf War, reaching 30-40 percent and creating "a major problem over large areas of Kuwait."(7) Following a mission to Kuwait in November of 1992, Richard Johnson, Project Manager for Mines Countermines and Demolitions reported that "the Rockeye duds were predominant and had to be very high compared to other submunitions."(8)
Ssgt. Larry Lane discussed the problems posed by unexploded ordnance for a team of engineers attempting to help Kuwait recover from the war.
At one elementary school alone in Fahaheel neighborhood of Kuwait City technicians recovered 1,220 Rockeye submunitions(10)
No specific figures on casualties related to Rockeye cluster bombs are available. Eric Prokosch notes that after the Rockeyes were authorized for use against North Vietnam in 1968, press reports stated that some of the bomblets penetrated the concrete lids of the one-person underground shelters which had been built throughout the country.(11)
Many people in Iraq and Kuwait have been injured and killed from unexploded submunitions since the Gulf War ended in 1991. Reports of casualties in 1993 cited 1600 deaths and 2500 injuries to civilians in Iraq and Kuwait.(12) It is not known how many of these casualties were due to Rockeyes.
Similarly, in the Serbia/Kosova war, there is no data available on the number of Rockeyes which have caused casualties since the end of the war in June of 1999.
The U.S. first used Rockeyes during the Vietnam War, beginning in 1968.(13) Rockeyes were used against trucks on the Ho chi Minh Trail. As noted by Capt. James Perso, "The Rockeye was a better weapon than 500-pound bombs because it had a denser pattern and the shaped charges were lethal to trucks."(14)
The US dropped 27,987 Rockeye bombs over Iraq and Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, resulting in the release of nearly 7 million bomblets.
Deminers working in Kosova have found Rockeye cluster bomblets, but precise figures on the number used are not known.
Israel procured the Rockeye and used it in its attacks on Lebanon in 1982, producing political difficulties between the US and Israel. In addition to the U.S. and Israel, Egypt and eight other countries are believed to have procured the Rockeye.(17)
The BLU 97/B Combined Effects Bomb is dropped from aircraft, or delivered by Tomahawk Cruise Missile and contains 202 submunitions. The submunitions combine anti-armor, incendiary, and fragmentation effects, making it "effective" against light armor and personnel. The bomb dispenser is nearly 8 feet long and is 15 ½ inches in diameter.(19)
The submunitions are carried in the SUU-65 Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD), which is dropped from aircraft as an unguided bomb.
The TMD is dropped from the aircraft, and opens according to the setting of the FZU-39/B Proximity Sensor. This sensor can be set to open the TMD at any one of 10 altitudes between 300 and 3,000 feet. The altitude setting on the fuze, along with the spin of the TMD is what determines the size of the area over which the submunitions disperse.(20)
The submunitions, designated as BLU-97/B, contain a shaped charge, a scored steel casing designed to break into approximately 300 steel fragments, and a zirconium(21) ring for incendiary effect. The submunitions are cylindrical in shape, and appear as elongated soda cans. Approximately 20 centimeters long, the BLU-97/B has a diameter of 6 centimeters. After the submunitions are released from the dispenser, parachute-like devices slow and stabilize them for impact at the proper angle.(22) The original Cyclotol explosive has been replaced with PBXN-107 explosive in the IM BLU-97.(23)
Delivery methods and soft sand led to high dud rates for the BLU-97 during the 1991 Gulf War. During the clearing of an airfield in Iraq following the war "every square meter on the airfield appeared to have one or two unexploded bomblets."(24)
Lieutenant General John McDuffie from the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff, stated that the dud rate for CBU-87s "is approximately five per cent."(25) Similarly, the Deputy Programme Manager for the United Nations Mines Action Coordination Center in Kosovo, reported that KFOR had stated the cluster bomb dud rate in Kosovo was "about 5%."(26) Many agencies and journalists repeat this 5% dud rate figure to estimate the number of unexploded cluster munitions still in Kosova.(27)
Field interviews, along with past history, suggest that the 5% figure is decidedly conservative, However, there is little agreement or precision on the higher estimates. A June 1, 1999 Defense Week article notes that the CBU-87 can have an "acceptable dud rate up to 12 percent, but experience shows that it is actually between 5 percent and 7 percent."(28)
United Nations Mines Action Coordination Center (UNMACC) staff in Pristina, Kosova, stated in interviews in December 1999 that the cluster bomb dud rate for all types of cluster bombs used in Kosova, was 8%-11%.(30) The Director of UNMACC, John Flannagan, stated that between 5% and 30% of NATO cluster bombs dropped on Kosova, failed to explode.(31) A report filed from Mitrovica cites a 10%-15% dud rate.(32)
A Serbian report during the war cited a cluster bomb strike near the Gracanica Monastery totaling 14 dispensers with 3,500 bomblets and a 20%-30% failure rate.(33)
In a story filed for the New York Times, Carlotta Gall quotes a Halo Trust engineer as saying the dud rate for cluster bombs in Kosovo is perhaps as high as 30%, rather than the predicted 10 per cent.(34)
Duds figured heavily in the June 21, 1999 deaths of two NATO soldiers who were trying to destroy unexploded cluster munitions found in the village of Arlat. Lt. Gareth Evans and Sgt. Balaram Rai were killed, along with two KLA fighters, Osman Krasniqi, and Sami Gashi and a civilian bystander, while trying to dispose of about 60 unexploded bomblets.(35)
The scale of the unexploded cluster bomb problem in Kosovo was described by Brig Gen. John Craddock, commander of Task Force Falcon, not in terms of dud rates, but by their visibility from a helicopter. "When you fly over in a helicopter you can see a lot of cluster bombs--not a lot, but a significant amount of cluster bombs."(36)
The reasons for high dud rates are many and varied. During a field visit to Decani on December 17, 1999, this writer met deminers working for Action by Churches Together, who cited high altitude delivery, soft terrain, angle of impact, and vegetation such as trees or bushes as contributing factors to a high dud rate.(37) This contrasts with the Asian Defence Journal's assertion in 1991 that "hard or soft terrain, snow, mud or even water will initiate detonation."(38)
The use of dated cluster bombs (cluster bombs with expired warranty dates), may also contribute to a higher dud rate. De-mining engineer Phil Straw noted that his agency "has found dozens of casings and canisters all over Kosovo, and . . . all of them were out of date and thus more likely to land without exploding."(39) Mennonite Central Committee found two CBU-87 cluster bomb containers in Decani, each of which had an expired warranty date.(40)
Donald MacDonald, Programme Manager for Mines Advisory Group in Pristina, Kosova, notes that the British RBL 755 cluster bomb has several time-sensitive components, including rubber/neoprene bushes, rubber inflation bags, springs which could become coil-bound, linkages and valves, and pyrotechnic gas motors.(41)
We do not yet have conclusive information on cluster bomb dud rates under combat conditions. In the immediate aftermath of a war, when refugee populations are returning to their homes, the priority is clearance, not dud-rate calculations. While carefully collected data from the field regarding dud rates is not available, it is clear that many field observers feel the rate is considerably higher than five per cent. Whatever the rate, there are hundreds of Kosovars and Serbs who know from the personal tragedies they have experienced, that the rate is too high.(42)
The footprint of a cluster bomb is the area covered by the bomblets or submunitions when they impact the ground. The size of the footprint is determined by a variety of factors, including design, altitude from which the dispenser is dropped, altitude at which the dispenser opens, the dispenser spin rate,(43) wind, and slope of the ground on which the bomblets fall. Given the many variables which determine footprint size, it is not surprising that reported cluster bomb footprint sizes also vary.
In a study after the Gulf War, William F. Andrews notes that high-altitude accuracy problems were overcome by the "large lethal patterns of submunitions" in weapons such as the CBU-87.(44)
William Arkin notes that "a medium to high-altitude delivery will generally result in submunitions covering an area 400 X 800 ft., or roughly 125 meters by 250 meters."(45) The Asian Defence Journal estimates the footprint from a high spin dispenser to be 90 meters by 110 meters.(46)
Testimony by Major General Charles Wald, of the Department of Defense, sets the CBU-87 footprint at approximately 200 meters by 400 meters.(47)
Other estimates of footprint size from Kosovo suggest that sometimes the affected area is considerably larger. One Serb report indicates that two cluster bombs together create a footprint of 150 meters by 1,000 meters.(48) In another Serb report, a cluster bomb dropped near the town of Prizren created "a number of craters spread over the distance of some 700 meters."
Some of the discrepancy in the estimated sizes of footprints may also result from differences between the "main impact area" of a cluster munition strike, and the entire perimeter created by all the submunitions in a strike. While the majority of cluster munitions in a strike generally fall within a concentrated area, there may well be "stray" munitions which fall a distance from the main impact area. These "stray" munitions may or may not always be included in the estimated footprint size.(49)
The actual footprint created by a cluster bomb strike is significantly smaller than the area within which casualties may occur. The fragmentation effect of the CBU-87 is extraordinary. The exploding bomblet sends 300+ steel fragments in all directions at "extremely high velocities."(50) These fragments can "damage light armor and trucks at fifty feet" and "cause human injury at 500 feet."(51) Thus anyone within 500 feet of the perimeter created by the bomblets in a cluster strike could potentially be hit by flying shrapnel.(52) While a typical footprint for a CBU-87 strike may be 200 X 400 meters, the area in which people would risk injury during the strike would be closer to 350 X 550 meters.
Finally, it is important to note that the footprint figures cited above are for only one CBU-87 cluster bomb. A typical cluster bomb strike on a given target is likely to involve multiple cluster bombs, thereby creating a larger footprint area. For example, when a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) team searched Musa Village in the Mitrovica area of Kosova, they discovered that at least five cluster bombs had been dropped on one hillside.(53)
Similarly, in a park just on the outskirts of Pristina, the administrative capital of Kosova, allied forces dropped up to 20 cluster bombs on a small Yugoslav army installation. The building belonging to the installation was presumably destroyed by a larger bomb, but the wooded hillsides on both sides of the road through the park are roped off and marked as dangerous. The ordnance from the 20 cluster bombs used in the strike covers a wide area.(54)
NATO has provided demining agencies with information about where cluster munitions were dropped in Kosova, including detailed grid references. This has helped the demining agencies locate and mark a number of cluster bomb strike areas in an effort to minimize casualties until the ordnance can be cleared. However, John Flanagan (UNMACC) notes that many of these references "turned out not to be correct. . . . They may have intended to drop six bombs on one target and four go off somewhere else, as much as one kilometer from the intended spot."(58)
Military strategists are sensitive to collateral damage from inaccurate cluster munitions strikes, particularly if they are highly publicized. In May of 1999, the United States temporarily halted their use "following two incidents of off-target impacts of cluster munitions."(59) Human Rights Watch first revealed this information in a memorandum to delegates at the Certain Conventional Weapons review conference in December 1999, stating that "President Clinton issued a directive prohibiting further cluster bomb use in the conflict. . . . In doing so, the president has set a precedent for restricting cluster bomb use."(60) In its February 2000 report on civilian casualties in Kosovo as a result of NATO bombing, Human Rights Watch reiterated that international criticism of cluster bombs as potentially indiscriminate led to "an unprecedented (and unannounced) U.S. executive order in the middle of May to cease their further use in the conflict."(61) According to Human Rights Watch observations, "U.S. cluster bomb use did apparently stop at that time, . . . although British cluster bomb use continued."(62)
A letter from Lieutenant General Fulford, the Director of Joint Staff at the Department of Defense, indicates that cluster bomb use by the US did resume in Serbia/Kosovo. In response to a request from Representative Dennis J. Kucenich requesting a copy of the executive order and related memos referred to by Human Rights Watch, Gen. Fulford stated that
"Cluster munitions are governed by the same Law of Armed Conflict requirements that apply to the use of any other weapon in the military inventory."(64) When considering a strike against a specific target, the military advantage is weighed against the collateral effects. If the expected collateral damage is judged to be excessive in relation to the military advantage, the attack does not take place.(65) The task of "producing targets" was a laborious process involving lawyers, targeteers, and intelligence analysts, who were charged with reworking all attack plans for any target where more than 20 civilians might be killed.(66)
Testimony by Maj. Gen. Charles Wald in the wake of the decision to temporarily halt the use of cluster munitions during the Serbia/Kosova war suggests that "military advantage" generally wins over concerns about collateral damage. After noting that military lawyers review all targets for "proportionality considerations," Major Wald was asked:
Q. Have lawyers vetoed use of these--these military lawyers--have they vetoed occasionally the use of CBU-87s?
WALD: Never. It's not illegal. It's totally within the law of armed conflict, and it's legal in the international community to use that weapon.(67)
The U.S. DOD Kosovo Operation After Action report to Congress in February 2000 had but one paragraph dedicated to the use of Combined Effects Munitions (CEM), and reiterated the DOD contention that their use is legal and that they are not mines, while paying lip service to the collateral damage effects:
CEM is an effective weapon against such targets as air defense radars, armor, artillery, and personnel. However, because the bomblets are dispensed over a relatively large area and a small percentage of them typically fail to detonate, there is an unexploded ordnance hazard associated with this weapon. These submunitions are not mines, are acceptable under the laws of armed conflict, and are not timed to go off as anti-personnel devices. However, if the submunitions are disturbed or disassembled, they may explode, thus, the need for early and aggressive unexploded-ordnance clearing efforts. Combined effects munitions remain an appropriate and militarily effective weapon when properly targeted and employed. However, the risk of collateral damage, as with any weapon, must be considered when employing these weapons.(68)
Human Rights Watch immediately issued a harsh criticism of the report. HRW indicated that while US during the conflict had made operational changes in the face of errors, including the secret order to halt the use of cluster bombs, the US failed to acknowledge any need for changes to NATO doctrine or practice. It singled out the report's consideration of cluster bombs as a "feeble justification . . . without acknowledging their unacceptable risk to civilians."(69)
Similarly, the Washington Post account of the targeting process, notes that "only once--in the case of an electronic plant in the Serbian town of Nis--did the [targeting] group reject a target for lack of a sufficient military link."(70)
Cluster bombs create minefields of unexploded ordnance which are difficult to find and mark, even with the aid of new mapping technologies. Springtime in Kosova is a particularly dangerous time, as this is when gardening and agricultural work begins anew, and children spend more time outdoors. It is the children who are frequent victims. In a three-week period during late March and early April, 2000, 3 children were killed and 13 seriously injured by NATO's untracked cluster bombs in Kosova.(71)
Casualties
It is impossible to know how many of the post-Gulf War casualties to civilians resulted from the CBU-87/B (BLU-97) as opposed to Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) munitions. However, it is known that the BLU-97 caused the deaths of 7 U.S. engineers attempting to clear a single runway in Iraq.(72)
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, there were some 1,600 deaths and 2,500 injuries attributable to cluster munitions. Included in the newspaper accounts were descriptions of cluster bombs which looked like "orange striped soda cans," no doubt the CBU-87/BLU-97.(73)
Casualty information which distinguishes between unexploded ordnance, cluster bombs and landmines in Kosova is not available from UNMACC. The UNMACC summary of casualties from mines, various types of unexploded ordnance, and cluster bombs between June 1, 1999 and February 29, 2000, reports a total of 349 injuries and 93 deaths.(74)
Various newspaper accounts indicate that 40%-50% of these casualties have resulted from cluster bombs.(75)
There is no data regarding which type of cluster munition has caused the most casualties in Kosovo. Given the fact that CBU-87s were most numerous, it is likely that CBU-87s are also causing a considerable number of the cluster bomb related casualties. There is anecdotal evidence to support this, as the bright yellow bomblets are sometimes remembered by survivors.
"It was yellow and it had a parachute," Jashari, 10, said of the cluster bomb--roughly the size of a soda can--that he and his friends found in October 1999 near the village of Baboshu. "We picked it up, and we banged it in the field. Then I poked it with a stick, and it exploded."(76)
>The children reasoned that the bright yellow containers--shaped like soda cans and topped with little parachutes--had not exploded when they were dropped and therefore must be duds. "It started blowing fire," said Bekim, 11, lying half blind and heavily bandaged in a gloomy hospital bed, "It hit me in the face, and I started running, and then it blew up."(77)
In April 1999, "[w]hen seven cousins from the Koxha family found a yellow tube attached to a mushroom-shaped cloth in a pasture, they thought it was a toy. They did not imagine it was a cluster bomb that would soon kill five of them and seriously injure two others."(78)
As noted earlier, NATO troops and KLA fighters are among those who have died from unexploded cluster bombs since the end of the war.(79)
One of the highly publicized accidents involving CBU-87s during the war occurred in the Serbian city of Nis. On May 8, 1999 a cluster bomb strike aimed at the Nis airport went awry. The city's hospital complex and outdoor market were both hit by combined effects munitions, resulting in 15 deaths and 70 injuries. Police reported finding 20 unexploded bomblets in the area of the strikes. "About 10 yellow canisters with parachutes attached were visible on the street near the hospital."(80)
One man who was injured in this attack, 72 year-old Vladimir Jovanovic, died some 11 months later on April 4, 2000, when he was working in his yard with a shovel. His shovel accidentally hit a buried cluster bomb which blew up and killed him.(81)
Post-war information about cluster bomb related casualties in Serbia has been difficult to find. It is clear, however, that not all the unexploded ordnance was cleaned up in the immediate aftermath of the war.
Contractors
Aerojet General and Alliant Techsystems were the two principal contractors for the CBU-87 until Olin Ordnance purchased Aerojet 1994. Aerojet General is headquartered in Downey, CA, and Alliant Techsystems is located in Hopkins, Minnesota.
Olin was awarded a contract of $95 million for the delivery of 8,200 CBU-87s in October of 1994.. Most of these were for the U.S. Air Force, but several hundred were for "overseas buyers."(82)
Alliant Techsystems won a $71 million contract for the delivery of nearly 5,800 CBU-87s to the US Air Force in September of 1994.(83)
Major subcontractors have included Day & Zimmerman St. David's, PA, and Goodyear Aerospace, Akron, OH.(84)
User
The US dropped 10,035 CBU-87/B's on Iraq and Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War.(85) In addition, the U.S. Navy launched 27 TLAMD cruise missiles carrying the CBU-87/B.(86) The TLAMD carries 166 bomblets.
In August of 1998, the US launched TLAMD cruise missiles on Afghanistan, in an effort to destroy the training complex thought to be operated by Osama bin Laden. Sixty six missiles were launched on Afghanistan, but the number carrying cluster bomblets is not known. It is believed that Tomahawk missiles with unitary warheads struck first, partially in an attempt to lure people at the training complex outside, and make them vulnerable to the CBU-87 strikes which came shortly thereafter.(87)
The U.S. continues to use cluster munitions in its operations over Iraq. CBU-87s were used during a bombing raid on the city of Najaf, on July 19, 1999, which resulted in eighteen deaths and fourteen injuries.(88)
NATO forces dropped 2 CBU 87s during Operation Deliberate Force, between August 29-September 14, 1995.(89)
NATO forces dropped 1100 CBU 87/B's in Serbia and Kosovo during the Balkan War of 1999.(90)
Lt. General John M. McDuffie puts the number of cluster bombs dropped during the war with Serbia/Kosovo at "less than 1200," most of which were CBU-87s.(91)
Sales/Transfers
Other nations who have purchased or received CBU-87s from the U.S. include: United Arab Emirates,(92) Egypt,(93) and Saudi Arabia.(94)
A proposed purchase of the CBU-87 by Turkey in 1994 was withdrawn, after pressure from human rights groups and debate within the Executive Branch.
One may assume that U.S. military forces have pre-positioned CBU-87s at strategic locations around the world as part of U.S. munitions stocks. One indication of this came to light when two F-16s collided in August of 1999 during live ordnance training exercises in Korea. Several MK-82 bombs were recovered near the site of the crash, but one CBU-87 was reported missing.(95)
- CBU-97
- BLU-108/B Submunition
The Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) is an anti-armor cluster munition dropped from aircraft, with the capability of attacking multiple targets. It is designed to attack armored vehicles, such as tanks and other combat support vehicles.
Components
SUU-66/B Tactical Munitions Dispenser
The SFW uses the SUU-66/B Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD), which can carry 10 BLU-108/B submunitions. These submunitions each contain four armor-piercing projectiles whose infrared sensors detect armored vehicles in the target area. One sensor fuzed weapon thus dispenses forty projectiles.
The dispenser carrying the submunitions can be released from altitudes ranging from 300 ft to heights above 15,000 ft, in any weather conditions, day or night.(96)
BLU-108/B Submunition
Upon release from the Tactical Munitions Dispenser, the 10 submunitions, each weighing 3.86 kg., are stabilized by parachutes. Upon reaching a preset altitude, a rocket motor fires, causing the submunition to spin and release the four projectiles. Each projectile has a sensor which finds the infrared signature of a vehicle. When the submunitions reach an altitude of about 100 feet, the projectile fires a high-velocity slug at the heat source, effectively immobilizing the vehicle.(97)
Use
Despite the widespread assumption that sensor fuzed weapons would be used during the NATO/Yugoslavia conflict, the U.S. has denied using the weapon(98), and no evidence of its use has shown up during Kosova demining operations.(99)
Contracts/Contractors
- Textron Systems Division, Wilmington, Massachusetts
1st production contract awarded in April 1996 for 521 units
2nd production contract awarded in March 1997 for 542 units(100)
The U.S. Air Force plans to purchase 5,000 more sensor fuzed weapons by 2004.(101)
Targeting/Footprint
Each of the ten BLU 108 submunitions in one Tactical Munitions Dispenser contains 4 anti-armor warheads. Each of these warheads scans 2/3 of an acre. Thus the 40 warheads in one dispenser scan an area totaling 15 acres (roughly 500 X 1200 ft.).(102)
Future Developments
The Air Force is planning several improvements to the sensor fuzed weapon, including:
- a laser range finder which, when integrated with the infrared sensor, will improve the warhead's aimpoint. The laser technology will allow a target to be detected by its height, as well as by its infrared signature.
- higher projectile release, resulting in greater area coverage up to 600 X 1800 ft.
- a smaller projectile with an outer ring of shards, in order to make the weapon more threatening to "soft targets."(103)
The JSOW is a group of air-to-surface weapons which can be launched by aircraft from 15 nautical miles (low-altitude launch) to 45 nautical miles (high-altitude launch) from the target. This avoids the need for a direct fly-over of the target, and ensures greater safety to the aircraft and its crew. The JSOW is a cooperative program of the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with the Navy acting as the lead service. Full rate production was expected to begin in March, 2000.(104)
The JSOW is designed in three variants, two of which contain cluster munitions.
Components
AGM-154A Dispenser
The AGM 154A dispenser is an unpowered dispenser which glides to the target area, guided by both global positioning system (GPS) and inertial navigation system (INS) technologies. The AGM-154A carries 145 BLU-97A/B bomblets, also known as Combined Effects Munitions.
The AGM-154A operates with a "man in the loop," allowing last minute course adaptations to be made.(105)
Combined Effects Munitions: BLU-97A/B
The BLU-97A/B contains a shaped charge, and consists of a scored steel casing designed to break into 300 steel fragments. The submunitions are cylindrical in shape, and appear as elongated soda cans. Approximately 20 centimeters long, the BLU-97A/B has a diameter of 6 centimeters.
AGM-154B Dispenser
The AGM 154B dispenser is fully autonomous, and carries six BLU-108/B sensor-fuzed submunition sets. Each submunition set carries four anti-armor warheads, making a total of twenty-four submunitions.(106)
Sensor Fuzed Weapon: BLU-108/B Submunition
The BLU-108/B is stabilized by a parachute during its descent. Upon reaching a preset altitude, a rocket motor fires, causing the submunition to spin and release the four projectiles. Each projectile has a sensor which finds the infrared signature of a vehicle such as a tank. The projectile fires a high-velocity slug at the heat source, effectively immobilizing the vehicle.
Contracts/Contractors
- Texas Instruments
- Raytheon TI (formerly Texas Instruments Defense Systems & Electronics), Lewisville, TX. Raytheon received the initial full-rate production award for the AGM-154A variant of the JSOW which carries the BLU-97, Combined Effects Munitions. This contract was awarded in December of 1998. Raytheon received a $109.6 million US Navy contract modification for full-rate production of the AGM 154A JSOW on Feb. 1, 2000.(107)
Aerojet manufacturers the IM BLU-97 submunition for use in the JSOW. Aerojet then "then integrates 145 of the submunitions along with the dispenser and skin severance subsystems into the JSOW Baseline Payload," which is then delivered to prime contractor Texas Instruments for incorporation into the "JSOW All Up Round."(108)
Use/Casualties
The JSOW was first used during Operation Southern Watch over Iraq in January 1999. By the beginning of the war in Serbia/Kosova in March 1999, 17 JSOWs had been used in Iraq.(109)
The JSOW AGM-154A was also used during Operation Allied Force in 1999 in Serbia/Kosova, dropped from Navy F/A-18 aircraft.(110)
Future Developments
The Pentagon plans to purchase 19,000 of the JSOW missiles through 2013. However, a GAO study found that the JSOW was not able to hit moving targets, severely limiting its effectiveness. The GAO study was critical of the AGM 154B anti-armor variant which fires the Sensor Fuzed Weapon, also noting that it cannot ensure "minimizing of collateral damage from standoff distances."(111)
We can't just carpet bomb the enemy because the enemy hides all over the place including among civilians.(112)
The WCMD is a tail kit which can be fitted onto various cluster munitions dispensers to compensate for adverse weather conditions even during high altitude delivery. The purpose of the WCMD is to improve the accuracy of cluster munitions delivery, and to provide a greater margin of safety to the aircraft and pilots.
Components
The WCMD tail kit steers the dispenser to the target coordinates, adjusting for wind both aloft and on the surface. Components include an inertial measurement unit and wind estimation software.(113)
The tail kit replaces the existing tail kits on tactical munitions dispensers.
Munitions/Aircraft
The WCMD is designed to fit a variety of munitions dispensers, including the Combined Effects Munition (CBU 87/B), the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (CBU 97/B) and the Gator Mine System (CBU 89). The WCMD family of weapons will be carried on the B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15E, F-16, and F-117 aircraft. The WCMD will allow these aircraft to fly above anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles, and drop the cluster munitions from altitudes up to 45,000 feet.(114)
Targeting
According to Lt. Col. Steven Welch of Eglin's Area Attack Systems Program Office, the requirement for the WCMD is to achieve a circular error probable of 100 feet or less.(115) Tests carried out in June, of 1999 achieved a 5 meter circular error probable.(116)
Production/Sales
The U.S. Air Force plans to purchase 40,000 WCMD kits, to be used as follows:
| CBU-87/B (Combined Effects Munitions): |
30,000 |
| CBU 89/B (Gator Mine System): |
5,000 |
| CBU 97/B (Sensor Fuzed Weapon): |
5,000 |
Final operational evaluations will begin January 1, 2000. Full-rate production contracts are expected by October 1, 2000.(117)
The United Arab Emirates is seeking permission to purchase the WCMD tail kit.(118)
Contractors
Developed by both Alliant TechSystems and Lockheed Martin, the WCMD production contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin, of Orlando Florida. Major subcontractors for the WCMD production run are:
- Simmonds Precision Motion Controls, Cedar Knolls, NJ
- Honeywell Military Avionics, Minneapolis, MN
- Litton Guidance & Controls Systems, Woodland Hills, CA
- PRB Associates, Hollywood, MD(119)
Cost
Per unit cost for the WCMD is just under $9,000.(120)
Terrified Iraqis referred to the MLRS fire as "steel rain."(121)
If enemy personnel or light armored targets need killing, MLRS is a good choice.(122)
One additional concern about MLRS' use is the impact of dud submunitions. . . . No one wants to turn on a news broadcast and see a child who died from handling a dud.(123)
Among cluster munition delivery systems, the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is perhaps the most devastating in its impact. It is capable of blanketing large areas with deadly projectiles of metal in a very short period of time. The MLRS fires surface-to-surface rockets or missiles from a mobile launching pad. It is designed to attack rocket artillery, air defenses, trucks, light armor, and concentrations of troops. The rockets and missiles carry cluster warheads which release hundreds of submunitions.(124)
Components
M 26 Rocket
The M26 Rocket is launched from one of the 12 tubes in the launch pod. The rocket is 13 feet in length, and has a range of 10-32 kilometers. The standard M 26 rocket is unguided.(125)
M 39 Missile
The M 39 Missile (Army Tactical Missile System: ATACMS) is 13 feet in length, and has a range of 25 km-165 km. The missile (ATACMS Block I) is inertially guided.
M 270 Launcher
The M 270 Launcher is on a highly mobile tracked carrier, and consists of 12 rocket pods. The M 270 can launch 12 M 26 rockets in less than 60 seconds at up to six aimpoints. It can launch two M 39 missiles in less than 20 seconds at one or two aimpoints.(126)
M77 Submunition
The M 77 submunition is carried by the M 26 MLRS rocket. The rocket warhead contains 644 of the M77 submunitions. When all 12 rockets in a pod are fired, 7,728 submunitions are dispersed over the target area. The M77 contains a shaped charge, and can penetrate up to four inches of armor. When the submunition explodes, the steel case breaks into fragments, and is lethal up to a radius of four meters.(127)
The M77 submunition is 81 mm (3.2 inches) high and 38 mm (1.6 inches) in diameter.(128) The small size of this submunition makes it extremely dangerous because it is so easily hidden, and because something so small does not appear lethal.
M74 Submunition
The M74 submunition is used with the M 39 Missile (Army Tactical Missile System: ATACM) filled with composition B explosive filler.(129)
The M 39 Missile (ATACMS Block I) carries 950 of the M 74 submunitions, and disperses them over a wide target area. The M 74 submunitions are not effective against armor. These submunitions weigh 1.3 pounds, are 2.32 inches in diameter, and are lethal to a radius of 15m. The M 74 submunitions use the M219A1E1 fuze.(130)
Dud Rates
The M-77 submunition has a propensity to dud.(131) As of August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, over half of the MLRS rocket lots exceeded the 5% dud rate goal. According to a General Accounting Office report on MLRS submunitions used during the Gulf War, "the dud rates for lots sent to Southwest Asia and those still remaining in inventory ranged from 2 percent to 23 percent."(132) A full launcher load of 12 MLRS rockets would thus leave from 154 to 1,777 unexploded submunitions on the ground, all lethal and dangerous.
Based on the total number of MLRS rockets fired during the war, 17, 286(133), some 11,000,000 submunitions were dropped over Iraq and Kuwait. A conservative 5% dud-rate would indicate that over 556,000 MLRS duds were left behind. A 10% dud rate would, of course double this figure to tally over one million.
Actual battlefield conditions may create higher dud rates than those experienced during testing. Reports from the Kuwait theater of battle said that "one third of submunitions failed to explode due to landing in soft sand."(134)
Army initiatives to reduce the M77 dud rates include making changes to manufacturing specifications and suspending some high dud rate lots. However, because the Army considers the cost to be prohibitive, the specification changes are not expected to be incorporated into lots already manufactured. Therefore, many high dud rate lots will remain in inventory. Estimates are that nearly half of the remaining lots exceed the 5%-dud rate goal.(135) As of 1999, there were over 400,000 M-26 rockets with a total of 257,600,000 M-77 submunitions deployed in the field.(136)
Casualties
There were a total of 94 Desert Storm incidents among U.S. and coalition forces involving unexploded ordnance. Of this total, 33 incidents involved the improper handling of munitions.(137)
Submunitions were responsible for the deaths of at least 25 U.S. military personnel during Operation Desert Storm. Additional personnel were injured. "The Army attributes 16 of these deaths . . . to inappropriate handling of these submunitions."(138) Some of the deaths and injuries were caused by M77 submunitions.(139)
Even soldiers could not resist the impulse to play with unexploded submunitions.
. . . casualties occurred when a soldier found a piece of metal roughly the size of a spool of thread with a white ribbon on top. He was spinning it around by the ribbon. The MLRS submunition detonated, taking his life and the life of a person nearby.(140)
On the last day of the conflict . . . several members of the unit . . . collected what they thought were spent parachute flares. Several were observed hanging the submunitions from their ears and fingers.(141)
There have been numerous reports of casualties to the civilian population, and to deminers involved in ordnance cleanup after the war. It is impossible to know what percent of the post-war injuries and deaths have come from MLRS submunitions as opposed to air-delivered submunitions. Wright notes that the UXO ". . . is killing Kuwaiti civilians, desert nomads, soldiers along with civilian contractors from the U.S., France, and Britain."(142) As of 1993, estimates were that 1600 civilians had been killed, and over 2,500 injured from unexploded submunitions since the end of the war in Iraq and Kuwait.(143)
It is perhaps at least in part the concern about civilian casualties which prevented the use of the MLRS during the Kosova War. The use of cluster bombs was banned by the White House and the Pentagon in early May in the wake of a string of cluster bomb accidents where civilians were killed.(144) Following this decision, leaders at Task Force Hawk in Albania tried to ensure that the ban would not apply to MLRS rounds. "On the U.S. side, I think we took this decision . . . to give us greater assurance that we were not going to needlessly kill civilians," stated Lt. Gen. John Hendrix. "As a military person I would really rather see a different policy. . . ."(145)
Targeting/Footprints
The MLRS M26 rocket has a large "footprint" or dispersion of submunitions in the target area . . . and therefore requires detailed planning in close operations. . . . Specifically, they must be careful not to assign missions or targets that are closer than 2000 m to friendly troops.(146)
While footprint size from a single rocket would not approach 2000 meters, the accuracy of rocket fire is a safety concern. As noted in the newer draft of the Army Manual (6-60), "Rockets are inherently less precise than cannon projectiles. They have a much larger CEP(147) (and) are therefore much less predictable."(148)
The manual cites a number of factors which reduce the accuracy of rocket fire, taking special note of wind.
The MFOM(149) rockets are extremely sensitive to the low level winds due to the relatively low velocity of the rocket as it leaves the launch tube. The resulting effect produces a path heading error in the first few seconds of flight.(150)
The measurement of wind speed is often several hours prior to the actual firing of the rocket, and may take place some kilometers away, which may also contribute to targeting errors.(151)
Estimates on the actual size of an MLRS footprint vary. A single M-270 launcher can deliver 12 rockets, covering an area of 30-60 acres (60 acres = roughly 600 yards by 650 yards) in one minute with 7,728 anti-personnel bomblets.(152) According to Wright, the footprint area for a 6-rocket MLRS attack measures 200 meters by 300 meters.(153)
Wright notes that a "normal engagement requires a minimum of six rockets. . . to be fired into a target area."(154) While six rockets may be the minimum, the routine number of rockets used against a typical target appears to be much higher. A U.S. Army newsletter notes that the MLRS routinely fires 24-36 rockets against a point target, which is defined as an area 250 meters or less in length and width.(155)
Similarly, the Army Field Manual states that a fire plan should not exceed 72 rockets (6 launchers of 12 rockets each), indicating that a six rocket attack is indeed a minimum.(156) Since one launcher load of 12 rockets can have up to six aimpoints,(157) the footprint size for an entire MLRS attack could be considerably larger than the figures cited above.
Accounts of MLRS use in the Gulf War confirm the larger number of rockets in a routine attack. The First Cavalry Division Artillery Unit fired hundreds of rockets on February 13 during a strike on Iraqi positions. After an initial salvo from 19 launchers, the unit waited 25 minutes before firing a second salvo of "another hundred rockets."(158)
As with bombs dropped from the air, no tracking or mapping of MLRS submunitions is required. As noted by Wright,
These locations of UXO "footprints" . . . were not tracked, and never passed to mobility planners. UXO confirmation information was only available when reconnaissance units happened upon CBUs and DPICMs. . . . Vehicle and track operators drove into areas, during daylight and night operations, not knowing UXO were scattered on the ground.(159)
The Army manual does not seem overly concerned about the danger posed by passing through MLRS footprint areas, as it states:
Some risk will be accepted when firing MLRS into areas friendly units could occupy or pass through during future operations.(160)
A newer draft of the Army manual offers a slightly stronger wording.
Planners must consider the risk when firing MLRS into areas friendly units could occupy or pass through during future operations.(161)
In addition, the manual suggests that the Extended Range MLRS (see below), which employs a submunition with a self-destruct fuze, "should therefore be used in operations where friendly forces are expected to later occupy the impact area."(162)
Large footprints, dud rates and rocket flight errors notwithstanding, the military assumes the possibility of using MLRS fire in urban areas. Maj. James Hutton from the Center for Army Lessons Learned published a paper on the "Use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)."(163) He notes that the growth in urban areas will influence the nature of future battles. Special techniques will be required when directing MLRS fire, so that the submunitions can attack troops which may be using tall buildings as protection. He concludes that
Commanders must still consider the precision error and large submunitions dispersion patterns when applying this method of attack due to the high probability of extensive collateral damage.(164)
Use of urban areas to hide MLRS units should "be free of civilians," and "be away from the center of the built-up area."(165)
Capt. Kevin Brown, in a review of the tension between U.S. casualties and collateral damage, notes that restrictions on the use of heavy firepower in urban areas are usually ignored when armies begin to experience heavy casualties.(166)
When facing fierce opposition, both Russian and U.S. rules of engagement have either been disregarded or relaxed once infantry forces began taking heavy casualties. This pattern has held true over the past 50 years of urban conflict.(167)
Given the high dud rates, and the high number of MLRS lots currently in stock, any use of the MLRS in the foreseeable future will certainly repeat the indiscriminate and risk-filled patterns of the past.
Variations and New Developments
Extended Range MLRS
The extended range rocket carries a reduced load of M85 submunitions (518), but its modified rocket motor increases its range to 45 kilometers. The 12 rockets from a single M-270 launcher carry a total of 6,216 submunitions.(168)
Extended Range Rocket (guided)
The addition of a guidance and control system improves the accuracy of this extended range rocket. The design allows for the inclusion of a global positioning satellite which could aid the rocket in meeting a 5 meter circular error probable requirement.(169)
MLRS Smart Tactical Rocket
A smart munition warhead capable of attacking stationary or moving targets.(170)
Army TACMS Block IA
This missile carries 300 M74 bomblets. A GPS receiver will allow positioning data updates for increased accuracy, with a range of 100 kms. to 300 kms.(171)
Army TACMS Block II
This missile will carry the BAT (Brilliant Anti-armor Technology) submunition. The missile will have a range of from 35 kms. to 140 kms. The Block II payload is 13 submunitions equipped with both acoustic and infrared sensors, allowing it to attack moving targets.(172)
Army TACMS Block IIA
This missile will carry six improved BAT submunitions effective against both hard and soft targets.(173)
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
This rocket system is designed to carry the complete MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM), but with a much lighter and more mobile firing platform. The entire assembly will be able to drive onto a C-130 or larger cargo aircraft, fully loaded and ready to fire. Some firepower will be sacrificed due to its smaller size, as it can accommodate only one six-pack of rockets or a single Army Tactical Missile System missile. HIMARS can presently reach 165 kms with the ATACMS Block I missile, but will be able to reach 300 kms when the ATACMS Block JA missile is fielded.(174)
HIMARS will replace the M-77 submunition with the XM-85 DPICM. This munition contains a self-destruct fuse mechanism, which is designed to reduce the dud rate to one percent or less.(175)
Contracts/Contractors
- Loral Vought Systems, Dallas, TX
- Lockheed Martin Vought Systems Corp., Grand Prairie, TX(176)
- United Defence, York, PA and Aiken, SC, produces MLRS carriers.(177)
- Euro Rocket System GmbH: a joint-venture between Lockheed Martin Vought Systems and Diehl Stiftung & Company (Germany).(178)
The GMLRS includes components produced by Alliant Techsystems (GPS sensor) and Litton (fiber-optic guidance system).(179)
Sales
MLRS sales and agreements have been concluded with 14 other countries, including: Greece, Denmark, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, South Korea, Japan, Bahrain, the United Kingdom, Turkey and France.(180)
The Guided MLRS is a joint effort to meet the requirements of France, Germany, Italy, UK, and the US. The development phase is funded 50% by the US, with each of the European countries responsible for a 12.5% share. Full-rate production is expected to run from 2004-2012, with one production line in the US and one in Europe.(181)
The U.S. Army plans to purchase 80,000 GMLRS rockets.(182)
Use
During the Gulf War, U.S. forces used 232 MLRS launchers, and fired 17,286 MLRS rockets.(183) The MLRS was deployed to Albania during the 1999 war with Serbia, but was not used. The MLRS system functions as a cover for Apache attack helicopters.(184)
Many other countries in the world have developed their own multiple rocket systems. These systems are noted in other sections of this report.
Improved Conventional Munitions are projectiles fired from artillery. The projectiles consist of a mechanical time fuze and a body which contains a number of submunitions. There are two types of ICM rounds; the antipersonnel (AP) round, and the dual-purpose (DP) round.
Antipersonnel rounds are "effective" against exposed personnel. When the AP rounds strike the ground, the submunitions are thrown upward 4-6 feet so that they will detonate in the air, maximizing their capacity to injure and kill.(185) The dual purpose round is equipped with a shaped charge, and is effective against personnel as well as lightly armored vehicles.
The table below summarizes the ICM and DPICM currently in use by the U.S.
|
U.S. Army Submunition Ordnance(186) |
| Weapon |
Projectile |
Number of Grenades |
Submunition |
|
Anti-Personnel ICM |
|
|
| 105-mm |
M444 |
18 |
M39 |
| 155-mm |
M449 |
60 |
M43A1 |
| 203-mm |
M404 |
104 |
M43 |
|
Dual-Purpose ICM |
|
|
| 105-mm |
M915/M916 |
42 |
M80 |
| 155-mm |
M864 |
72 |
M42/M46 |
| 155-mm |
M483A1 |
88 |
M42/M46 |
| 203-mm |
M509 |
180 |
M42/M46 |
Targeting/Dispersion
All ICM submunitions are ejected in flight over the target area. When the fuze activates, a charge detonates and expels all the submunitions from the rear of the projectile.
The submunitions disperse in somewhat of a doughnut pattern, with fewer submunitions in the center. The pattern is dependent on a number of factors, particularly the angle of fall and the height at which the submunitions are ejected.(187)
DPICM M483A1
This projectile carries 88 M42 and M46 submunitions. When ejected at relatively low altitude, the submunition footprint covers an area roughly 50 X 100 meters. When ejected at higher altitudes, the footprint increases to roughly 100 X 120 meters.(188) The M483A1 carries the M577 fuze.
DPICM M864
While carrying fewer submunitions (72) than the M483A1, its dispersion pattern is larger, normally 150 X 150 meters.(189)
According to the Field Manual FM 6-30, ICM fire should not be targeted any closer than 600 meters from friendly troops.(190)
Dud Rates
The dud rate for ICM or DPICM rounds is between 2 and 3 percent in ideal conditions. However, there are several important considerations which may increase the dud rate as follows:
The ICM or DPICM should not be fired into forests; mountainous areas (slope greater than 60 percent); or rocky, uneven terrain. This type of terrain may increase the dud rate and reduce the effectiveness of the rounds. Also, the effectiveness of ICM and DPICM rounds may decrease if the target area is marshy or covered with deep snow or water.(191)
Gulf War accounts of duds on the battlefield were not specific enough to indicate whether they were delivered by MLRS or artillery fire. It is clear, however, that there were DPICM duds. One example is this account from the 2nd Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment.
The Gunners and the Pathfinders rolled forward surrounded by Abrams and Bradley's firing at and destroying enemy armor. Driving through an unexploded Dual Purpose ICM field, SSG. . . Johnson. . . and SSG Jimenez . . . detonated a DPICM bomblet and blew a hole in their HMMWV tire. Undaunted by their experience and uninjured, they continued forward movement on their tire rim.(192)
Use
According to the Human Rights Watch Arms Project, some 100,000 cluster munitions were shot from artillery projectiles during the Gulf War.(193)
Future Developments
Extended Range Guided Munition: with a range of 63 nautical miles, this will deliver 72 submunitions to the target area.
Extended Range Artillery Projectile: Designated the SM982, this projectile will carry submunitions, two SADARM sensor fuzed submunitions, or a unitary warhead.
Manufacturers
- PRIMEX Technologies - St. Petersburg, FL(194)
-produces the M864 155mm DPICM
-Extended Range Guided Munition
-Extended Range Artillery Projectile
-M80 Grenade Body Assembly(195)
- Raytheon - Lexington, MA(196)
-Extended Range Guided Munition
-Extended Range Artillery Projectile
- Bulova Technologies - Lancaster, PA(197)
-produces the M577 fuze for the M483A1 155mm DPICM
- Amron L.L.C. - Waukesha, WI
-produces the M80 Grenade Body Assembly for the 105mm, M915, DPICM.(198)
The SADARM is an artillery projectile which contains two submunitions effective against armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other armored targets.(199)
Components
Projectile
The SADARM is a 155 mm projectile which can be fired from a 155 mm Howitzer. Each projectile contains two submunitions. The projectiles can be fired a distance of 22 kilometers, using the Paladin artillery system.(200)
Submunitions
When the submunitions are delivered over the target area, they are stabilized and slowed down by parachutes. During their descent, the two submunitions use multiple sensors to search an area roughly the size of four football fields (130 meter radius footprint). The sensors include infrared, as well as active and passive millimeter wave (MMW) radar. When the target is detected, the submunition fires a formed penetrator warhead which "defeats" the armored vehicle or artillery unit.(201) Preliminary testing of the SADARM system completed in March 2000 yielded a 77% reliability (i.e. 77% of the submunitions hit targets). Limited Use Testing (LUT) by the army was scheduled for April 11-May 2, 2000, and successful LUT will lead to stockpiling by the US Army.(202)
Contracts/Contractor
- Aerojet, a segment of GenCorp., Azusa, California.
- Alliant Techsystems, Hopkins, Minnesota.(203)
Aerojet awarded Dyconex, a Swiss manufacturing firm a contract for printed wiring boards for use on SADARM, in an effort to expand its European supplier base.(204)
Future Developments
In 1997, the Army stated its intention to purchase over 70,000 SADARM projectiles through 2013. SADARM has been in low-rate production since March of 1995. Following the completion of testing, SADARM should go into full-rate production, possibly during the year 2000.(205)
The Tomahawk Cruise Missile is a guided, surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1000 miles. The missile uses Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) guidance systems. Its low heat emissions and ability to fly at low altitudes make it difficult to detect by infrared or radar.(206)
Components
Combined Effects Munitions: BLU-97A/B
The TLAM-D version of the Tomahawk Cruise Missle carries 166 BLU-97A/B bomblets, also known as combined effects munitions. The bomblets are carried in 24 packages in the body of the missile, and can be dispensed in groups against as many as three targets.(207)
Use/Casualties
During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. Navy launched 27 TLAM-D cruise missiles.(208) Cruise missiles were launched on Iraq during a December 1998 bombing campaign.(209)
The TLAM D was used during Operation Allied Force in the Serbia/Kosovo conflict. Two-hundred and eighteen (218) Tomahawk's were fired during the conflict, some with unitary warheads, and others with the submunition warhead.(210)
U.S. Naval forces launched an attack of 50+ TLAM-C/D cruise missiles on a suspected terrorist training base in Afghanistan, on August 20, 1998.(211)
Sales/Transfers<
The United Kingdom, via Foreign Military Sales Agreement, purchased 65 Tomahawk cruise missiles.(212)
1. Steve Erlanger, "At Sites of NATO Accidents, Scent of Death, Sound of Fury," New York Times, 13 April 1999, p. A1
2. Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing (Zed Books, London/New Jersey, 1995), p. 101, quoting Commander Haley, Director, Plans and Programs for Munitions, Bureau of Naval Weapons.
3. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/4686/Weapons/mk20.html.
4. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101.sys/dumb/mk20.htm.
5. Ibid.
6. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/4686/Weapons/mk20.html.
7. Lt. Col. Gary Wright, "Scatterable Munitions=Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1993, p. 12.
8. Ibid.
9. Ssgt. Larry Lane, Soldiers, February 1992, http://www.execpc.com/~pvmiii/gulfwar/articles/s19202.html)
10. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?" December 1994, p. 19.
11. Prokosch, The Technology of Killing, p. 102.
12. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs to Turkey?" p. 18.
13. Prokosch, The Technology of Killing, p. 101.
14. Capt. James C. Perso, "Rockeyes Like Trucks,"
http://www.vriweb.com/awattack/rockeye.htm.
15. Marquardt Company was an aerospace subsidiary of CCI Corporation. Marquardt was a designated producer of Rockeye II systems since 1971. PR Newswire, Tulsa, OK, 22 April 1982.
16. Wall Street Journal, 31 August 1979, p. 23. Honeywell Inc. was awarded a contract for Rockeye II bomb dispensers, totalling $11.3 million.
17. "CBU-59/B, Mark 20 Rockeye, ISCB Cluster Bombs, and Mark 7 Universal Dispenser," Forecast Intl/DMS Inc, 1994.
18. Kevin Tibbles, "Hospital Tends to War's Wounded," NBC News, 24 May 1999. http://www.msnbc.com/news/271331.asp
19. See, e.g., Edmond Dantes, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal, March 1991, p. 82.
20. As the TMD drops from the airplane, a lanyard opens the tail fins to stabilize the bomb as it falls. The TMD directs the tail fins to cant or tilt according to a preset angle, which determines the spin rate of the dispenser. http://www.atk.com/defense/descriptions/products/fuzes/fzu-39/B, Alliant Tech Systems; Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?," December 1994, p. 27; "Cluster Weapons," http://www.shreve.net/~blade/cluster.html.
21. Zirconium is a lustrous metal which, when finely divided, may "ignite spontaneously in air." "Zirconium," http://www.callamer.com/ezecho/elements/zr.html.
22. Dantes, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal.
23. Aerojet website,
http://www.aerojet.com/program/framecontent.pl
?url=photos/jsow-3.jpg&program_ID=34, visited 22 April 2000.
24. Lt. Col Gary W. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions = Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) = Fratricide," USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, 1993, pp. 10-11.
25. Letter from Lt. General John M. McDuffie to Titus Peachey, 2 March 2000.
26. Patrick Channer e-mail to Titus Peachey, 26 February 2000.
27. Thane Burnett, "An Evil Harvest, Deadly Legacy," Calgary Sun, 26 December, 1999; Human Rights Watch, "NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia," 11 May 1999 http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/clus0511.htm; Rachel Stohl, "Cluster Bombs Leave Lasting Legacy," The Weekly Defense Monitor, 5 August 1999.
28. Ron Laurenzo, "Cluster Bomb Dud Rates Cut, Army Says," Defense Week, 1 June 1999, quoting Francis Kosakowski, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, Utah.
29. Human Rights Watch, "Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, May 1999, p. 9.
30. Titus Peachey interview with Leoni Barnes, 16 December 1999.
31. John Henzell, "Nato Bombs Continue to Kill," The Press (Christchurch), 24 January 2000, quoting John Flannagan.
32. W.F. Deedes, "Sappers Seek the Deadly Harvest of Nato's Kosovo Cluster Bombs," London Daily Telegraph, 2 March 2000.
33. "3,500 Cluster Bombs Dropped Around Gracanica," 18 April, 1999, http://www.serbia-info.com/news.
34. Carlotta Gall, "Mines and Unexploded Bombs Wreak Death and Mayhem in Kosovo," New York Times, 6 August 1999.
35. Mark Fineman and Valerie Reitman, "The Path to Peace; Allies' Own Weaponry Poses Threat in Kosovo," Los Angeles Times, 23 June 1999; Paul Beaver, "Unexploded Ordnance Proves a Problem in Kosovo," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 June 1999.
Initially, NATO blamed Serbian laid landmines as the culprit, and condemned the Serbs for mining a school playground. Steve Smith, "Troops Die in Booby Trap," Scottish Daily Record, 22 June 1999. A spokesperson was quoted as saying "It is almost certain that these men died because of a booby trap which the Serbs callously left knowing an explosion would almost certainly kill or maim. . . . It beggars belief that they could do such a thing in a school." Ibid.
It was soon determined, however, that the deaths were caused by unexploded BLU-97 submunitions. Mark Fisher, "NATO Cluster Bombs Kill 4 Two Soldiers, Two Civilians Dead in Explosion," Edmonton Sun, 22 June 1999; Robert Fox, "Meanwhile, on the Spin Front," London Evening Standard, 23 June 23 1999.
36. Beaver, "Unexploded Ordnance Proves a Problem in Kosovo," Jane's Missiles & Rockets.
37. Titus Peachey interview with ACT deminers, Decani, Kosova, 17 December 1999.
38. Edmond Dantes, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal, March 1991, p. 82.
39. Carlotta Gall, "Mines and Unexploded Bombs Wreak Death and Mayhem in Kosovo," New York Times.
HALO Trust, the ordnance clearance agency for whom Straw works, has since clarified that it is uncertain that warranty dates have an effect on the dud rate. It also does not know if the weapons were re-inspected and were given an extended use-by date. E-mail communication from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe, dated 20 May 2000.
40. Photos of CBU-87 containers at Action by Churches Together warehouse, 17 December 1999. Warranty dates on the two containers were November 1997 and July 1998. Photos by Titus Peachey.
41. Donald MacDonald e-mail to Titus Peachey, 5 January 2000.
42. Other newspaper or magazine accounts presenting evidence of CBU-87 (BLU-97) duds include: Paul Watson, "Crisis in Yugoslavia," Los Angeles Times, 12 May 1999, p. A9; and Christopher Dickey, et. al., "Seeds of Carnage," Newsweek, 2 August 1999, p. 28.
43. Human Rights Watch, "Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia." The spin rate of the dispenser helps determine the size of the actual footprint . . . the faster the spin rate, the larger the footprint. This is further documented in Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?," December, 1994, p. 26; Dantes, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal. A low spin rate of 500 rpm creates a pattern of bomblets making impact roughly three meters apart. A high spin rate of 2500 rpm scatters the bomblets roughly six meters apart on impact.
44. William F. Andrews, "Airpower Against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard," Paper presented at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1995, http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/
research/ay1995/saas/andrewwf.htm.
45. Human Rights Watch, "Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia."
46. Dantes, "CBU 87 Combined Effects Munitions: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal.
47. Maj. Gen. Charles Wald, "Transcript: Pentagon Briefing on 'Operation Allied Force," 14 May 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/May1999/
t05141999_t0514asd.html.
48. http://www.serbia-info.com/news, "3,500 Cluster Bombs Dropped Around Gracanica," 18 April 1999.
49. E-mail from Donald MacDonald to Titus Peachey, 9 March 2000.
50. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster bombs for Turkey?"
51. Ibid.
52. Donald MacDonald e-mail to Titus Peachey, 9 March 2000.
53. Mines Advisory Group, "Kosovo," November 1999, p. 13.
54. The Hindu, Pristina, "The Hindu Editorial: A park waiting to explode," 1 April 2000; Notes and photos from a visit to the park on 18 December 1999, Titus Peachey.
55. Dantes, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munitions: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal.
56. Capt. Dan Hampton, "New Strategy, New Fighter, New Challenges," Air Force Magazine, July 1991, p. 59.
57. Titus Peachey interview with ACT deminers, 18 December 1999, Decani, Kosova.
58. Jonathan Steele, "Death Lurks in the Fields," The Guardian, 14 March 2000.
59. Letter from Lt. Gen. C.W. Fulford Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Joint Staff to Representative Dennis J. Kucinich (D, OH), 7 March 2000 ("Fulford Letter").
60. "Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Delegates," Human Rights Watch Arms Division, 16 December 1999.
61. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, February 2000, http:www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato.
62. Ibid. "The decision by the United States to temporarily suspend the use of certain cluster munitions during the air campaign was unilateral. The US decision did not prevent others nations participating in the air campaign from using any specific munitions or employing cluster munitions if such munitions were the appropriate weapon for the target selected." Fulford Letter.
63. Fulford letter (emphasis added).
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Dana Priest, "Target Selection Was Long Process," Washington Post, 20 September 1999.
67. Maj. Gen. Charles Wald, "Transcript: Pentagon Briefing on 'Operation Allied Force,'" 14 May 1999.
68. US Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 31 January 2000, p. 90.
69. "Pentagon Report Whitewashes Civilian Deaths in Yugoslavia," Human Rights Watch Press Release, 8 February 2000, http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/nato208.htm.
70. Dana Priest, "Target Selection Was Long Process," Washington Post.
71. Christian Jennings, "Children Reap Kosovo's Spring Harvest; Legacy of War as the Snow Melts, More Young Lives are Shattered by the Thousands of Cluster Bombs Which NATO Left Behind," The Independent (London), 8 April 2000.
72. Lt. Col.Wright, " Scatterable Munitions = Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) = Fratricide," p. 11. "On Feb. 26, 1991, Company A of the 27th Engineer Battalion had the mission to clear the 9,000 foot runway at As Salam to a width of 300 meters. . . . For some unknown reason, a pile of BLU-97 UXOs exploded unexpectedly killing the company commander, platoon leader, platoon sergeant and four other enlisted soldiers. This tragedy occurred during daylight killing experienced engineer soldiers who were doing their jobs after careful planning and rehearsal." Ibid.
73. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?," December 1994, pp. 17, 18.
74. Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Centre, Monthly summaries, 1 June 1999-29 February, 2000, p. 4.
75. Burnett, "An Evil Harvest, Deadly Legacy," Calgary Sun.
76. Jeffrey Fleishman, "In Peacetime Kosovo, bomb casualties continue," Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 November 1999.
77. Dan Eggen, "Bombs That Still Kill: NATO's 'Duds' in Kosovo," International Herald Tribune, 20 July 1999, p. 4.
78. Aleksandar Mitic, "NATO Cluster Bombs Take Their Toll in Kosovo", Agence France Press, 28 April 1999.
79. Bob Roberts, "Gurkhas Killed as School Cluster Bombs Explode," Birmingham Post, 23 June 1999.
80. Reuters, "Crisis in the Balkans: Casualties; Serbs Say 15 are Killed at Hospital and Market, Nis Serbia," New York Times, 8 May 1999, p. A7.
81. The Associated Press, "Man Killed in Explosion of Cluster Bomb," 4 April 2000, and e-mail from Bojovic Nikola, Nis, Serbia to Titus Peachey, 7 April 2000.
82. Jane's Defence Weekly, "CEM contracts go to Alliant, Olin," 22 October7 1994.
83. Ibid; See also, "Alliant Techsystems Awarded $71.3 Million Contract to Produce Combined Effects Munition," PR Newswire, 28 September 1994.
84. Gregory Fetter, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition and SUU-65/B Tactical Munitions Dispenser and Blu-97/B Submunition," Forecast Intl/DMS Inc., 1994, http://www.forecast1.com.
85. "Air-Delivered Munitions in Desert Storm," http://www.webcom.com/~amraam/munit.html (Source: Eliot A. Cohen, et. al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 5 (Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC, 1995)).
86. "Navy Dropped 11 Million Pounds of Bombs During 31 Days in Iraq War," Aerospace Daily, 13 March 1991.
87. David A. Fulghum, "Secrecy About Raids Hints More to Come," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 31 August 1998.
88. Zachary Fink, "A Visit to a Bombed Village," The Progressive, 1 October, 1999; Carmen Pauls, "Won't you stay for lunch?" MCC News Service, 24 August 1999. Article accompanied by photos of CBU-87 components left after the raid; Christopher Allen-Doucot, "Scenes From a Silent War," Hartford Catholic Worker.
89. Hellenic Resources Network, http://www.hri.org/docs/nato/summary.html.
90. Human Rights Watch, "Cluster Bombs: Memorandum For Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Delegates," 16 December 1999, http://www.hrw.org/hrw/about/projects/arms/memo-cluster.htm.
91. Lt. Gen. John M. McDuffie, Letter to Titus Peachey, 2 March 2000.
92. "Massive weapons buy for UAE-16s," International Defense Review, 1 November 1998. The UAE agreed to purchase 1,820 CBU-87 cluster bombs. See also, Defense Link News, "Memorandum for Correspondents," 143-98, 16 September 1998, http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Sep1998/.
93. "Dozen + Mideast Nations Bought Weapons Since Gulf War," Aerospace Daily, 10 December 1991. Egypt purchased 160 CBU-87 Cluster Bombs.
94. Barbara Starr, "Apache buy will keep Israeli edge," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 October 1992. Egypt purchased 600 CBU-87 cluster bombs.
95. "Two 8th Fighter Wing F-16Cs collide," Aerotech News and Review, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea, 13 August 1999.
96. Robert Wall, "The Devastating Impact of Sensor Fuzed Weapons," Air Force Magazine, 24 September 1998.
97. Ibid.
98. Gen. Charles Wald, "Transcript: Pentagon Briefing on 'Operation Allied Force,'" 14 May 1999.
99. Titus Peachey interview with Leonie Barnes, Information Officer at United Nations Mines Action Coordination Center, Pristina, Kosova, 15 December 1999; e-mail from Rae McGrath to Titus Peachey, 3 March 2000.
100. http://www.airforce-technology.com/
contractors/weapons/textron/index.html.
101. Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 April 1999,
http://www.janes.com/defence/features/
kosovo/newweapon.html; Press Release, "Textron Systems Awarded $142 Million Full Rate Production 2 Contract for the Sensor Fuzed Weapons (SFW), 25 March 1997, http://www.systems.textron.com/25march.htm.
102. Robert Wall, "The Devastating Impact of Sensor Fuzed Weapons," Air Force Magazine.
103. Ibid.
104. News Release, Raytheon Systems Company, 14 January 1999.
105. Jane's Air Launched Weapons, Issue 20, March 1995; William B. Scott/ PT MUGU and China Lake, Calif., "U.S. on Track With Glide Bomb," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 July 1996, pp. 54-60.
106. Janes Air Launched Weapons, Issue 20, March 1995.
107. Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, 1 February 2000.
108. Aerojet website,
http://www.aerojet.com/program/framecontent.pl
?url=photos/jsow-3.jpg&program_ID=34, visited 22 April 2000.
109. William Arkin, "Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Performance Details," Defense Daily, 10 February 2000.
110. "Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 31 January 2000, p. 92.
111. Vince Crawley, "GAO: Anti-Armor Missile Can't Hit Moving Targets," Defense Week, 7 September 1999.
112. Dick Caime, "Yugoslavia lesson: Value of munition strap-on kits," Aerospace Daily, 6 July 1999, p. 21. Caime is the Vice President of strike weapons at Lockheed Martin Electronics and Missiles.
113. http://www.apg.eglin.af.mil/wcmd/.
114. http://www.eglin.af.mil/publicaffairs/aug7/eagle1.html.
115. Circular error probable is the radius within which 50% of weapons aimed at a particular target will fall. See David Fulghum, "Isolated, Serb Army Faces Aerial Barrage," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19 April 1999, "Stealth Could Play Key Role in Kosovo, Despite Bad Weather," Armed Forces Newswire Service, 23 March 1999, and John M. Loh, "Final Operational Requirements Document CAF 401-91-I/II-B for Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser ACAT Level II," 23 September 1994, p. 8.
116. David Isby, " WCMD to begin low-rate production," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 September 1999.
117. " WCMD to begin low-rate production," Jane's Missiles and Rockets.
118. "UAE seeks WCMD for F-16s," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 December 1999.
119. Lockheed Martin News Release, Orlando, FL, "Lockheed Martin Wins $500 Million Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser Production, Integration Competition," 27 January 1997.
120. Jake Swinson, "WCMD begins production," Eglin Eagle Online Edition, 7 August 1998, http://www.eglin.af.mil/publicaffairs/aug7/eagle1.htm.
121. Dan Pillar, "Tools of war; Missile Systems still ringing up sales at Vought systems plant in Grand Prairie," Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, 5 July 1999, p. 7.
122. Lt. Col. John M. House, "MLRS in Low-Intensity Conflict," Field Artillery, October 1994, p. 12.
123. Ibid.
124. Net Resources International, Army Technology website, MLRS, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs/index.html.
125. MLRS, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs/index.html; Maj. James E. Hutton, Ed., "Use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)," http://call.army.mil.call/trngqtr/tq4-99/mlrs.htm.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Maj. Edmund J. Degen, "High Mobility Artillery Rocket System: Its Role in the Rapid Force Projection Initiative," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1998, p. 16. Because of the propensity to dud, the monograph states that "tactical maneuver plans should reflect the restrictions to movements that will occur if M-26 rockets are used in areas where later friendly maneuver may be required by the tactical situation."
132. Ibid., p. 6.
133. Lt. Col. Gary M. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions =Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 1993, p. 7.
134. Trevor Nash, "RO in Kuwait: The Big Clean-up," Military Technology, MILTECH, July 1991, p. 59.
135. GAO Report, "Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused by Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S. Submunitions," p. 10.
136. Degen, "High Mobility Artillery Rocket System: Its Role in the Rapid Force Projection Initiative," p. 16.
137. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions=Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," p. 16.
138. GAO Report, "Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused by Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S. Submunitions," p. 1.
139. Ibid., p. 1.
140. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions=Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," p. 18.
141. Ibid., p. 19
142. Ibid., p. 20.
143. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?" December 1994, p. 18.
144. Human Rights Watch Report, "Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign," February 2000 http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200.htm. While Human Rights Watch reported that the US halted use of cluster bombs, presumably for the remainder of the bombing campaign, the Department of Defense has stated that "following a review of US procedures," the use of cluster munitions resumed. Letter from Lieutenant General C.W. Fulford, Jr., Director, US DOD Joint Staff, to US Representative Dennis J. Kucinich, dated 7 March 2000.
145. Sean D. Naylor, "Commanders Fight to Keep Missiles, MLRS in Air War," Army Times, 7 June 1999.
146. Hutton, "Use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)," p. 3.
147. Circular Error Probable (CEP), is the radius within which 50% of the munitions fired at a specific target will fall.
148. Army Field Manual 6-60, "Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations," Draft 8-11-99, pp. 4-12.
149. MFOM stands for "MLRS Family of Munitions."
150. Army Field Manual 6-60, "Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations, Draft 8-11-99, Appendix B, p. B-1.
151. Ibid.
152. Dan Piller, "Tools of War; Missile Systems still ringing up sales at Vought systems plant in Grand Prairie," 5 July 1999.
153. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions=Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," p. 7.
154. Ibid.
155. Department of Army, "Brigade Utilization of Multiple-Launch Rocket System," http://12.18.94.22/Reports/ntc97-9/ta2sec2.htm
156. Army Field Manual 6-60, "Techniques, and Procedures for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations, 23 April 1996, p. 5-12.
157. Ibid., p. 1-1.
158. Maj. Mark S. Jensen, "MLRS in Operation Desert Storm," Field Artillery, August 1991, p. 32.
159. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions=Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," p. 17.
160. Army Field Manual FM 6-60, "Techniques and Procedures for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) operations," p. 3-2.
161. Army Field Manual FM 6-60, "Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations," Draft 8-11-99, p. 4-2.
162. Ibid., p. 4-4.
163. Maj. James E. Hutton, "Use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)," p.1 http://call.army.mil/call/trngqtr/tq4-99/mlrs.htm
164. Ibid., p. 1.
165. Ibid., p. 2.
166. Capt. Kevin W. Brown, "Urban Warfare Dilemma--U.S. Casualties vs. Collateral Damage," Marine Corps Gazette, January 1997, p. 38.
167. Ibid., p. 39.
168. http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs
169. Degen, "High Mobility Artillery Rocket System: Its Role in the Rapid Force Projection Initiative," p. 16.
170. Ibid. , p. 18.
171. Ibid., p. 19.
172. Ibid., p. 20.
173. Ibid., p. 20.
174. Degen, "High Mobility Artillery Rocket System: Its Role in the Rapid Force Projection Initiative," p. 7.
175. Degen, "High Mobility Artillery Rocket System: Its Role in the Rapid Force Projection Initiative," p. 17.
176. A complete history of the MLRS development from its inception in 1975 can be found at http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/systems/MLRS.html While other companies such as Boeing Aerospace, Martin Marietta, Emerson Electric, and Northrop were involved in the very early stages, Vought Corporation was selected as the prime contractor in 1980. Various corporate mergers along the way led to Lockheed Martin Loral Vought as the current prime contractor for the MLRS family of weapons.
In 1979 and 1980, the governments of the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom signed memoranda of understanding for the joint development of the MLRS weapons system.
177. "United Defense Awarded Greek MLRS Carrier Contract," Defense Daily, 18, June 1999.
178. Christopher F. Foss, "New venture will give Euro clients MLRS upgrades," Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 June 1999. The venture will provide European customers of MLRS with upgrades and new rockets.
179. "Litton Team to Produce Guidance Set for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System," Business Wire (Le Bourget, France), 16 June 1999.
180. MLRS, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs/index.html; Prasun K. Sengupta, "MLRS Artillery for Area Saturation," Asian Defence Journal, October 1998, p. 29.
181. Christopher F. Foss, "New Venture will give Euro clients MLRS upgrades," http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs/index.html.
182. "Litton Team to Produce Guidance Set for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System," Business Wire.
183. Wright, "Scatterable Munitions=Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)=Fratricide," p. 7. See also Pillar, "Tools of War," Ft. Worth Star-Telegram. Other sources cite figures of 10,000 or 20,000. See a Center for Defense Information source at:
http://www.cdi.org/ArmsTradeDatabase/
United_States/Multiple_Launch_Rocket_System_(MLRS).txt
Also review Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?" p. 16, fn 53.
184. Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent Russian defense analyst, compared the US MLRS, in its support role to the Apache, to the Russian Grad and Uragan MRLS systems. He noted that both the Russian and US versions of the systems were designed for repelling massive armor attacks - he predicted that the use of MLRS in Kosovo would meet with the same failure the Russian systems had faced in Chechnya from 1994-96. Pavel Felgenhauer, "Defense Dossier: U.S. Will Not Win Kosovo," Moscow Times, 8 April 1999.
185. FM 6-30, "Special Munitions: Improved Conventional Munitions and Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions," Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991.
186. FM 6-30 U.S. Army, "Number of Grenades in each ICM Round," Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991, and Air Land Sea Application Center, "UXO: Multiservice Procedures for Operations in an Unexploded Ordnance Environment," July 1996.
187. DPICM Dispersion Patterns, http://sill-www.army.mil/tngcmd/usmc/dpicm0.htm
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid.
190. Army Field Manual 6-30, "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Observed Fire," 16 July 1991, http://155.219.39.98/doctrine/fmspg.htm.
191. Ibid.
192. "2nd Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment 'Gunner Battalion' Historical Summary, Operation Desert Storm 24-28 February, 1991.
193. "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?" Human Rights Watch, December 1994.
194. http://www.primextech.com/lca.html.
195. Commerce Business Daily, 14 May 1999.
196. http://www.defense-news.com/current/page6228.htm.
197. http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/
ammunition/bulova/indes.html.
198. Commerce Business Daily, 7 August 1998.
199. Aerojet website,
http://www.aerojet.com/program/framecontent.pl
?url=detail/how_sadarm_works.htm&program_ID=36, visited 22 April 2000.
200. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/a308/Smartbooks/Arty/tsld019.htm.
201. "GenCorp Aerojet's SADARM Excels in Army Reliability Tests," PR Newswire, 16 September 1999; See also, US Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, website, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/a308/Smartbooks/Arty/tsld019.htm, visited 22 April 2000.
202. "Aerojet SADARM Smart Munition Excels in Final U.S. Army Reliability Tests," Aerojet Press Release, 17 March 2000,
http://www.aerojet.com/program/news
/nr_031700_sadarm_excels_in_final_rdap.htm; "Aerojet's SADARM Smart Munition Successful in Another Round of U.S. Army Reliability Tests," Aerojet Press Release, 8 February 2000,
http://www.aerojet.com/program/news
/nr_020800_aerojet_sadarm_successful_in_another_round_of_tests.
203. Alliant Techsystems website,
http://www.atk.com/Defense/descriptions/
products/smart-weapons/sadarm.html, visited 22 April 2000.
204. Aerojet Communications Department News Release, 30 November 1999.
205. Armed Forces Newswire Service, 28 September 1999;
Defense Daily, 2 March 1999; Patrick Swan, "Army accepts first production 155mm SADARM rounds," Picatinny Arsenal Voice, 17 February 1999, http://w3.pica.army.mil/voice1997/970117/sadarm.html, visited 22 April 2000.
206. http://www.salts.icpphil.navy.mil/
ships/paulhamilton/tmhwk.htm. http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/
factfile/missiles/wep-toma/html.
207. Amy Truesdell, "Cruise Missiles: The Discriminating Weapon of Choice?" Jane's Intelligence Review, 2 February 1997.
208. "Navy Dropped 11 Million Pounds of Bombs During 31 Days in Iraq War," Aerospace Daily, 13 March 1991.
209. Philip Shenon, "U.S. Declares It Might Need More Strikes on Iraq Soon," New York Times, 21 December 1998.
210. "Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report," Department of Defense, 31 January 2000, http://dtics5.dtic.mil/pubs.
211. http://www.realworldrescue.com/tlam.htm.
212. "Tomahawk Cruise Missile," Navy Fact File, 28 January 1999, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/
